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“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.”1
A decade ago, Justice Scalia made prophetic statements regarding the
First Amendment. He said that because the Pledge of Allegiance
includes the phrase “under God,” recital of the Pledge appears to raise an
Establishment Clause issue.2 He went on to say,
In Barnette [the Supreme Court] held that a public school student could not be
compelled to recite the Pledge; [the Supreme Court] did not even hint that she
could not be compelled to observe respectful silence—indeed, even to stand in
respectful silence—when those who wished to recite it did so. Logically, that
ought to be the next project for the Court’s bulldozer.3

These statements were prophetic because the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals recently held that the words “under God” in the Pledge violate
the Establishment Clause.4 The Ninth Circuit reached this conclusion
despite the fact that the United States Supreme Court has consistently
distinguished the use of the phrase “under God” in the Pledge and other
similar invocations as not violating the Establishment Clause from other
practices, such as holiday displays and displays of religious referents
like the Ten Commandments on government grounds, that do violate the
Establishment Clause.5
1. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
2. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 639 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
3. Id.
4. Newdow v. United States Cong., 292 F.3d 597, 612 (9th Cir. 2002), cert.
granted in part, Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 540 U.S. 945, 945 (2003),
rev’d, 124 S. Ct. 2301 (2004), reh’g denied, 125 S. Ct. 21 (2004). Certiorari was limited
to:
(1) Whether respondent has standing to challenge as unconstitutional a public
school district policy that requires teachers to lead willing students in reciting
the Pledge of Allegiance; and (2) Whether a public school district policy that
requires teachers to lead willing students in reciting the Pledge of Allegiance,
which includes the words ‘under God,’ violates the Establishment Clause of
the First Amendment, as applicable through the Fourteenth Amendment.
The Supreme Court did not decide the case on its merits (question two from above), as it
decided that Mr. Newdow did not have standing to bring this suit. Newdow, 124 S. Ct. at
2305. Despite no decision on the merits, there are interesting concurring opinions that
will be discussed infra note 52.
5. See County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 603 (1989) (“[T]here is an
obvious distinction between crèche displays and references to God in the motto and the
pledge.”); Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 788–92 (1983) (discussing the constitutionality
of Nebraska’s legislature opening with a prayer by a state-employed clergyman, the
Court states, “[t]o invoke Divine guidance on a public body entrusted with making laws
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This type of inconsistency in results is the norm, not the exception, in
Establishment Clause cases.6 In order to eliminate inconsistent results
and promote predictability in litigation, a more uniform test should be
developed and applied in Establishment Clause cases. Equally important
reasons for establishing a more uniform test include resolving inherent
problems in the current tests employed by the Supreme Court and
reassuring religious believers that religion has a proper place in society.
The Establishment Clause is an issue that has been commented on for
decades, but a decision as to which test is appropriate to employ in these
cases needs to be made now to prevent the consequence of religion being
removed from the public arena entirely.
Part I of this Comment will delineate the inherent problems with the
two main tests currently utilized by the Supreme Court in Establishment
Clause cases: the Lemon7 test and the endorsement test.8 Part II will
further highlight the flaws of the Lemon and endorsement tests by

is not, in these circumstances, an ‘establishment’ of religion or a step toward
establishment; it is simply a tolerable acknowledgment of beliefs widely held among the
people of this country.”); Freethought Soc’y v. Chester County, 334 F.3d 247, 264 (3d
Cir. 2003) (“Of course, we agree that [O’Connor’s] examples of ‘ceremonial deism’ are
not violations of the Establishment Clause, e.g., the opening of court with the
introduction ‘God save the United States and this Honorable Court’ (used in this very
Court), or the inscription ‘In God We Trust’ on U.S. coins.”).
6. The Lemon and endorsement tests are applied in a wide variety of
Establishment Clause cases. Compare Marsh, 463 U.S. at 784–86 (holding that the
Nebraska Legislature’s practice of opening each legislative day with a prayer by a
chaplain paid by the State does not violate the Establishment Clause), with N.C. Civil
Liberties Union Legal Found. v. Constangy, 947 F.2d 1145, 1152 (4th Cir. 1991)
(concluding that courtroom prayer violates the Establishment Clause); compare Murray
v. City of Austin, 947 F.2d 147, 149, 156 (5th Cir. 1991) (concluding that the City’s
insignia, containing a Latin cross and used on police cars, letterhead, uniforms of city
employees, etc. does not violate the Establishment Clause), with Harris v. City of Zion,
927 F.2d 1401, 1413–14 (7th Cir. 1991) (holding that Zion’s seal, incorporating a shield
draped with a ribbon reading “God Reigns” and a Latin cross, violates the Establishment
Clause); compare Freethought, 334 F.3d at 270 (concluding that the Ten
Commandments plaque affixed to the Chester County Courthouse does not violate the
Establishment Clause), with Glassroth v. Moore, 335 F.3d 1282, 1285, 1297 (11th Cir.
2003) (holding that the placement of the Ten Commandments monument in the
courthouse rotunda violates the Establishment Clause), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1000
(2003). But see Shannon P. Duffy, Two Tablets Cause a Big Headache, 228 LEGAL
INTELLIGENCER 1 (July 7, 2003), available at WL 7/7/2003 TLI 1 (suggesting that the
factual differences between the plaque in Freethought and the monument in Glassroth do
not result in inconsistent holdings between the two circuits).
7. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
8. See id. at 612–13; Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 690 (1984) (O’Connor, J.,
concurring).
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examining their application to “holiday display” cases9 and the recent
“Ten Commandments”10 cases. Part III will argue that applying a modified
coercion test is the best means for achieving the most consistent results,
even though it too has its limitations. Part IV will compare the practical
application of the modified coercion test to the holiday display11 cases,
the recent Ten Commandments12 cases, and the “Pledge of Allegiance”
case.13 Part V will conclude that keeping Church and State separate does
not require the complete bifurcation of all things religious from the rest
of society, and that the modified coercion test is best suited for achieving
the goal of appreciation of and tolerance for divergent points of view in
the United States.
I. INTRODUCTION
In its refusal to “be confined to any single test or criterion” in
Establishment Clause cases, the Supreme Court has employed various
tests over the last fifty years: the child benefit theory, the neutrality
theory, the Lemon test, the traditions test, the denominational preference
theory, the endorsement test, and the coercion test.14 Of these, the
Lemon test and the endorsement test have been used most often.15
A. The Lemon Test
The Lemon test consists of three prongs. Any given statute, act, or
display must: (1) have a secular legislative purpose, (2) have a principal

9. Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 578; Lynch, 465 U.S. at 670–71.
10. Freethought, 334 F.3d at 249–50; Glassroth, 335 F.3d at 1284.
11. Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 578; Lynch, 465 U.S. at 670–71.
12. Freethought, 334 F.3d at 249–50; Glassroth, 335 F.3d at 1284.
13. Newdow v. United States Cong., 292 F.3d 597 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. granted in
part, Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 540 U.S. 945, 945 (2003), rev’d, 124 S. Ct.
2301 (2004), reh’g denied, 125 S. Ct. 21 (2004).
14. See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 679; see also Jon Veen, Note, Where Do We Go From
Here? The Need for Consistent Establishment Clause Jurisprudence, 52 RUTGERS L. REV.
1195, 1200–17 & nn.42, 49, & 164–66 (2000) (“The term child benefit theory is one term
used by scholars to discuss the Court’s analysis in Everson [although the Court itself did
not employ this term in Everson]. . . . The Court formulated the neutrality theory [in
Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp] . . . . The Supreme Court created the Lemon test in
[Lemon]. . . . [T]he traditions test [was used in Walz and Marsh] . . . . Larson v. Valente
was one of the few cases in which the Supreme Court used the denominational
preference theory . . . . Justice O’Connor first articulated the endorsement test in
Lynch. . . . [And t]he coercion test actually has its roots in Engel v. Vitale. . . . [But, t]he
landmark case involving the coercion test is Lee v. Weisman. . . .”).
15. See Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 583 n.4 (1987) (“The Lemon test has
been applied in all cases since its adoption in 1971, except in Marsh v. Chambers.”); see
also Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 597 n.47 (“The Court . . . proceeds to apply the controlling
endorsement inquiry . . . .”).
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or primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion; and (3) not
foster excessive government entanglement with religion.16 This test was
first formulated in Lemon v. Kurtzman in 1971, as an attempt to draw
lines consistent with the primary evils that the Establishment Clause
Those evils consisted of the government’s
sought to avoid.17
“sponsorship, financial support, and active involvement” in religious
activity.18 The Court did not discuss why these prongs are particularly
important or helpful in deciding Establishment Clause cases, but simply
accumulated these criteria from prior decisions.19 There is one unifying
theme, however, connecting these prior cases: government neutrality.20
16. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612–13 (1971). In Lemon, the Court
applied this three-pronged test and struck down two statutes that provided for
reimbursing for the cost of teachers’ salaries, textbooks, and instructional materials at
nonpublic schools. Under each statute, aid was given to church-related schools, which
the Court found to be unconstitutional. Id. at 607.
17. Id. at 612.
18. Id.
19. Id. The Court simply stated:
Every analysis in this area must begin with consideration of the cumulative
criteria developed by the Court over many years. Three such tests may be
gleaned from our cases. First, the statute must have a secular legislative
purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither
advances nor inhibits religion; finally, the statute must not foster “an excessive
government entanglement with religion.”
Id. at 612–13 (quoting Bd. of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 243 (1968) and Walz v. Tax
Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970)) (citations omitted).
20. See Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 214–15 (1963) (“Judge
Alphonso Taft . . . in an unpublished opinion stated the ideal of our people as to religious
freedom as one of ‘absolute equality before the law, of all religious opinions and
sects’ . . . . ‘The government is neutral, and, while protecting all, it prefers none, and it
disparages none.’”); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 431 (1962) (“[The] first and most
immediate purpose [of the Establishment Clause] rested on the belief that a union of
government and religion tends to destroy government and to degrade religion.”); Torcaso
v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495 (1961) (“We repeat and again reaffirm that neither a State
nor the Federal Government can constitutionally force a person ‘to profess a belief or
disbelief in any religion.’”); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 441–42 (1961) (“But,
the First Amendment, in its final form, did not simply bar a congressional enactment
establishing a church; it forbade all laws respecting an establishment of religion.”);
Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 312 (1952) (“There cannot be the slightest doubt that
the First Amendment reflects the philosophy that Church and State should be
separated.”); Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 211 (1948)
(rejecting the arguments that the First Amendment was only intended to prohibit
governmental preference of one religion over another and that the Fourteenth
Amendment did not make the First Amendment applicable to the States); Everson v. Bd.
of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947) (“Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up
a church. Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one
religion over another.”); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940) (“The First
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The Court finds government neutrality to be the proper goal because of
the problems that the fusion of government and religion can cause.21 To
achieve government neutrality, the Court noted that, in considering the
Establishment Clause eight times in the previous one hundred years, it
consistently held that Congress was to have no power regarding
religious belief or its expression.22
1. Arguments Supporting Use of the Lemon Test
Supporters of the Lemon test have argued that the test provides the
proper framework for Establishment Clause cases insofar as it fosters the
separationist philosophy that Church and state should remain separate.23
Proponents of the Lemon test maintain that its separationist philosophy
is sound because it respects religious and irreligious beliefs, safeguards
the political community from the damaging effects of religious and
irreligious exclusions, and protects religion’s role in society.24 Because
citizens can suffer from governmental actions that attack their religious
or irreligious beliefs, the government should respect these beliefs.25 The
Lemon test furthers this goal by prohibiting the government from taking
action that disrespects the religious or irreligious beliefs of individual
citizens.26
Proponents of the Lemon test also argue that the test assists in
maintaining a religiously inclusive political community.27 Because the
government communicates to its citizens that some people are “insiders”
while others are “outsiders” whenever it disrespects religious or
irreligious beliefs, the Lemon test aims to protect citizens from negative
Amendment declares that Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion or prohibiting free exercise thereof. The Fourteenth Amendment has rendered
the legislatures of the states as incompetent as Congress to enact such laws.”).
21. Schempp, 374 U.S. at 222 (stating that neutrality must be the goal because
“powerful sects or groups might bring about a fusion of governmental and religious
functions or a concert or dependency of one upon the other to the end that official
support of the State or Federal Government would be placed behind the tenets of one or
of all orthodoxies” and the Establishment Clause prohibits this).
22. Id. Rather, the Court has
consistently held that the [Establishment] clause withdrew all legislative power
respecting religious belief or the expression thereof. The test may be stated as
follows: what are the purpose and the primary effect of the enactment? If
either is the advancement or inhibition of religion then the enactment exceeds
the scope of legislative power as circumscribed by the Constitution.
Id.
23. Daniel O. Conkle, Toward a General Theory of the Establishment Clause, 82
NW. U. L. REV. 1113, 1172 (1988).
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 1176.
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feelings associated with exclusion.28 Thus, because the Lemon test protects
individual citizens, proponents of the test assert that it also protects the
corresponding interests of the entire political community.29 Those who
support the Lemon test also contend that it protects religion’s role in
society.30 This argument relies on the fact that governmental support of
religion is often unhelpful, if not counterproductive, to “genuine religion.”31
Another argument in support of the Lemon test is that rigorous
application of the test is the best means of providing adequate protection
against impermissible government involvement with religion.32 Proponents
have argued that this is especially true in light of the Court’s decisions in
Lynch v. Donnelly and Marsh v. Chambers, where the Court primarily
focused on the historical nature of a particular religious activity in
determining its constitutionality.33 This is because a historical inquiry
approach threatens consistency in Establishment Clause jurisprudence as well
as the First Amendment protections that application of the Lemon test
has secured.34
The Lemon test is also defended on the grounds that there are not any
real defects with the test itself, but that the problems instead stem from
the Court’s “nonapplication, malapplication, and misapplication” of it.35
28. Id. at 1176–78.
29. Id. at 1176.
30. Id. at 1179–80.
31. Id. at 1180. Conkle gives three reasons as to why governmental action
designed to benefit religion does not, in fact, actually benefit religion. First, democracy
operates according to secular arguments and political bargaining, neither of which is
well-suited for religious considerations. Id. Second, because there are widespread
differences regarding religion, even among mainstream religions, any governmental
action designed to support religion will be so general that the “religion” supported will
be mild at best, but will most likely be meaningless. Id. at 1181. Finally, governmental
“support” for religion is not really “support” at all. Rather than strengthening religion,
governmental support tends to “degrade and cheapen religion.” Id. Conkle also defines
“genuine religion” as religion that is intrinsically sound, or at least perceived to be
intrinsically sound, by religious believers. Id. at 1180.
32. Kenneth Mitchell Cox, The Lemon Test Soured: The Supreme Court’s New
Establishment Clause Analysis, 37 VAND. L. REV. 1175, 1201–03 (1984).
33. Id. at 1201–02.
34. Id. at 1202.
35. Carole F. Kagan, Squeezing the Juice from Lemon: Toward a Consistent Test
for the Establishment Clause, 22 N. KY. L. REV. 621, 634 (1995). Interestingly,
however, Kagan proposes a modified Lemon test. Id. at 645. She advocates that the first
prong, that there be a secular purpose, is not difficult to apply, so it should be retained in
Establishment Clause analysis. Id. Kagan also says that the second prong, that the
primary effect neither advance nor inhibit religion, should also be closely examined, but
that governmental action as a whole should be reviewed. She states that a statute or state
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Therefore, proponents of the Lemon test argue that it should not be
discarded for two reasons: (1) it reinforces the proper goal of government
neutrality; and (2) it is unclear as to which test should replace the Lemon
test.36
2. Arguments Against Use of the Lemon Test
Despite these arguments in favor of the Lemon test, there are some inherent
difficulties with the test. Some of these difficulties are highlighted by
judicial dissatisfaction with the test. For example, the test’s usefulness in
providing concrete answers in Establishment Clause cases is questioned
by Justice Kennedy as he notes that Supreme Court cases simply refer to
the test as a “helpful signpost” or “guideline.”37 One main difficulty with
the Lemon test, and one reason why justices are dissatisfied with it, is
that it requires a determination of subjective legislative intent.
There are several roadblocks to determining legislative intent, which
is necessary under the first prong of the Lemon test. The first obvious
hurdle is the fact that Congress is made up of many individuals who
support various pieces of legislation for vastly different reasons.38 Can it
program “should not be gauged solely by its effect on religious institutions, but in light
of the goals of the program in toto.” Id. at 646. Finally, Kagan discusses the dilemma
that the entanglement prong can pose. She notes that a government entity seeking to
distance itself from a religious institution or message may monitor that institution or
message too closely in ensuring that government and religion are not entangled. Thus, in
an effort to not entangle itself with religion, the government will still be excessively
entangled with religion by virtue of its efforts to prevent such entanglement. Id. at 647–48.
To avoid this problem, Kagan proposes that the entanglement prong be narrowed so that
excessive entanglement is only found when the government’s involvement is not
“content neutral.” Id. at 648. This would result in the government not being able to
inquire into a religious institution’s messages simply to make sure that the state is not
sponsoring a religious message, but would allow the government to inquire into religious
institutions on the basis of some other factor, such as health and safety or tax monitoring.
Id. Kagan says that this would not constitute excessive entanglement because “the
inquiry is based upon neutral factors applied to all bodies equally, rather than upon the
religious message conveyed.” Id. The formulation of a modified test seems to contradict
Kagan’s assertion that “the Court’s difficulty with the test lies not in any defect or want
of reasoning in the test . . . .” Id. at 634.
36. Id. at 644–45.
37. County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 656 (1989) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Kennedy expresses further distaste for
the test when he states, “[I] do not wish to be seen as advocating, let alone adopting,
[this] test as our primary guide in this difficult area.” Id. at 655.
38. See Max Radin, Statutory Interpretation, 43 HARV. L. REV. 863, 870 (1929–1930).
In discussing discovering legislative intent when a statute is ambiguous, Radin states:
That the intention of the legislature is undiscoverable in any real sense is
almost an immediate inference from a statement of the proposition. The
chances that of several hundred men each will have exactly the same
determinate situations in mind as possible reductions of a given determinable,
are infinitesimally small. The chance is still smaller that a given determinate,
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really be said that a group of people, with different motives and objectives,
enacted a given piece of legislation for one single purpose?39 Ascertaining
legislative intent would remain difficult even if there were only one
legislator representing a legislature.40
Another problem is that inquiring into legislative intent gives legislators
an incentive to lie.41 If legislators who voted to pass legislation on
account of their religious beliefs knew that the legislation would be
struck down as a violation of the Establishment Clause if their religious
motives became known, these legislators would have reason to lie. To ensure
the litigated issue, will not only be within the minds of all these men but will
be certain to be selected by all of them as the present limit to which the
determinable should be narrowed. In an extreme case, it might be that we
could learn all that was in the mind of the draftsman, or of a committee of half
a dozen men who completely approved of every word. But when this draft is
submitted to the legislature and at once accepted without a dissentient voice
and without debate, what have we then learned of the intentions of the four or
five hundred approvers?
Id. at 869–70. This discussion represents the most obvious difficulty with ascertaining
legislative intent: the relationship between the intent of a collective legislature and the
intentions of the individual legislators.
39. Steven D. Smith, Symbols, Perceptions, and Doctrinal Illusions: Establishment
Neutrality and the “No Endorsement” Test, 86 MICH. L. REV. 266, 284 (1987).
40. GERALD C. MACCALLUM, JR., LEGISLATIVE INTENT AND OTHER ESSAYS ON
LAW, POLITICS, AND MORALITY 5 (Marcus G. Singer & Rex Martin eds., 1993).
MacCallum states:
The fundamental question “what was the legislator’s intent” subsumes a
number of more specific questions:
1. Was his intent to enact a statute—i.e., was the “enacting” performance not,
perchance, done accidentally, inadvertently or by mistake?
2. Was his intent to enact this statute—i.e., was this the document (the draft)
he thought he was endorsing?
3. Was his intent to enact this statute—i.e., are the words in this document
precisely those he supposed to be there when he enacted it as a statute?
4. Was his intent to enact this statute—i.e., do these words mean precisely
what he supposed them to mean when he endorsed their use in the statute?
5. How did he intend these words to be understood?
6. What was his intent in enacting the statute—i.e., what did he intend the
enactment of the statute to achieve?
7. What was his intent in enacting the statute—i.e., what did he intend the
enactment of the statute to achieve in terms of his own career?
Id.
41. See Smith, supra note 39, at 284; see also Jeffrey S. Theuer, Comment, The
Lemon Test and Subjective Intent in Establishment Clause Analysis: The Case for
Abandoning the Purpose Prong, 76 KY. L.J. 1061, 1072–73 (1988) (“The emphasis of
the ‘purpose’ prong on individual intent appears to present a test too difficult to apply.
The sources which reveal such intent can be ‘contrived and sanitized, favorable media
coverage orchestrated, and post-enactment recollections conveniently distorted.’”)
(footnotes omitted).
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that the legislation would survive an Establishment Clause attack, legislators
would claim to support the legislation for every reason other than
religious ones. Because ascertaining legislative intent is a near impossible
task, and because it is not necessarily accurate even when it is determined, it
is not a helpful factor in deciding Establishment Clause cases.42
Subjective legislative intent is also not a useful inquiry because the
Supreme Court has often refused to engage in intent questions.43 This is
because a practical difficulty exists in determining legislative intent
based upon inadequate or incomplete legislative records.44 Further,
examining legislative intent is problematic because the issue of whose
intent counts is disputed.45 For example, the Court has looked to
legislative history and statements of purpose made by a statute’s sponsor
to ascertain intent.46 One cannot assume, however, that all members
voting for a particular piece of legislation agree with a statement made
by one particular legislator regarding the purpose of the legislation.47
Even if these statements or legislative history properly explain the
purpose of a statute, a problem with the “purpose” prong remains:48 the
42. See, e.g., Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 636 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Justice Scalia notes that in prior cases, the Supreme Court has held that the government
may not act with the purpose of advancing religion, except (“now and then”) when the
Free Exercise Clause says that it must. Id. The government can also act with the
purpose of advancing religion when it seeks to eliminate existing government hostility
(“which exists sometimes”) toward religion. Id. Finally, the government can act with
the purpose of advancing religion when it is merely accommodating religious practices.
Id. Yet, at some point in accommodating religion (although “it is unclear where”),
intentional accommodation is equivalent to fostering religion, which is obviously
unconstitutional. Id. Therefore, according to Justice Scalia, these “cases interpreting
and applying the purpose test have made such a maze of the Establishment Clause that
even the most conscientious governmental officials can only guess what motives will be
held unconstitutional.” Id.
43. Theuer, supra note 41, at 1070. Theuer notes that in United States v. O’Brien,
391 U.S. 367, 383–84 (1968), Chief Justice Warren gave three reasons for rejecting a
judicial standard based on legislative intent. Id. First, what certain people say about a
given piece of legislation that they were involved in passing is not indicative of what the
entire legislative body intended the legislation to mean or accomplish. Id. Second, if a
piece of legislation were struck down because of illicit motives, the legislature could
simply state new reasons for enacting a new law at a later time. Id. Third, taking motive
into account could hinder the lawmaking process by allowing good laws with bad
motives to be struck down. Id.
44. Hal Culbertson, Religion in the Political Process: A Critique of Lemon’s
Purpose Test, 1990 U. ILL. L. REV. 915, 917.
45. William B. Petersen, “A Picture Held Us Captive”: Conceptual Confusion and
the Lemon Test, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1827, 1835 (1989).
46. Id. at 1836.
47. Id. at 1838.
48. Id. Petersen argues that there would still be problems with ascertaining which
statements accurately express legislative purpose and then assessing the truth of these
statements. Id. Petersen questions whether or not courts should assume that legislatures
are acting in good faith when they state what the “official” purpose of a given statute is. Id.
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assumption that the existence of a religious purpose behind a statute
necessarily leads to a religious effect of the statute.49 These criticisms
highlight the fact that legislative intent is difficult to ascertain, and not
necessarily meaningful when it is determined, because religious purpose
does not always translate into religious effect.
The second prong of the Lemon test requires that the primary or
principal effect of a statute, act, or display neither advance nor inhibit
religion. This requirement is problematic because it is often difficult to
determine the primary or principal effect of any given statute, act, or
display. For example, in Wallace v. Jaffree, 50 the Supreme Court dealt
with the constitutionality of a statute that authorized a period of silence
for meditation or voluntary prayer. The Court found that the legislative

49. Id. at 1842. “[T]he Court often incorrectly assumes a causal relationship
between the first two parts of the Lemon test, and concludes that a religious purpose
necessarily leads to a religious effect.” Id. Some might object to this, however, stating
that the existence of a religious purpose alone should be enough to invalidate a practice
as unconstitutional. Indeed, the Court itself has construed the Lemon test in this way.
See Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 582–83 (1986) (“The Establishment Clause
forbids the enactment of any law ‘respecting an establishment of religion.’ The Court
has applied a three-pronged test [the Lemon test] to determine whether legislation
comports with the Establishment Clause. . . . State action violates the Establishment
Clause if it fails to satisfy any of these prongs.” (footnote omitted)). One prong of the
Lemon test is that the legislature must have adopted the law with a secular purpose. Id.
at 583. Thus, laws that do not have a secular purpose can be invalidated solely on this
ground. In Edwards, the Court struck down a Louisiana statute that prohibited the
teaching of evolution in public schools unless creation science was also taught. Id. at
593–94. The statute was deemed unconstitutional because the appellants failed to
identify a clear secular purpose for the statute. Id. at 585; see also Stone v. Graham, 449
U.S. 39, 39, 41 (1980) (holding that a Kentucky statute that required the posting of the
Ten Commandments on the wall of each public classroom in the state was
unconstitutional because it had no secular legislative purpose). It is not clear, however,
why the presence of a religious purpose alone should invalidate a statute or practice if the
statute or practice does not promulgate a religious effect. See, e.g., Wallace v. Jaffree,
472 U.S. 38, 56–57 (1985) (stating that the statute authorizing a one-minute moment of
silence for meditation or voluntary prayer was unconstitutional because the “State did
not present evidence of any secular purpose”). In Wallace, there was no discussion
regarding the statute’s advancement of religion independent of the Court’s analysis of
legislative intent. Id. at 60. Thus, nothing in the opinion indicated that the practical
effect of this statute (that voluntary prayer was one acceptable activity to engage in
during the moment of silence) resulted in prayer occurring more frequently than prayer
occurred before the statute was enacted (where only meditation was referred to). If the
statute has the same effect regardless of whether or not it was motivated solely by
religious purposes, it is not necessary to deem it unconstitutional when motivated by
religious purposes. See also infra notes 52–56 and accompanying text.
50. 472 U.S. at 41–42.
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intent of the sponsor of the statute was clear in that case.51 The majority
noted that there was only one significant textual difference—the addition
of the words “or voluntary prayer”—between an earlier version of the
statute and the statute at issue in the case.52 To the majority, this
indicated that the State intended to characterize prayer as a favored
practice.53 Chief Justice Burger, however, disagreed with the majority
regarding the effect of the statute.54 He said that Alabama did not
endorse prayer simply because it enacted a statute stating that voluntary
prayer was one of several authorized activities during a moment of
silence.55 Thus, for the majority, the primary effect of the statute was an
endorsement of prayer as a favored practice, but for Justice Burger, the
primary effect of the statute was to clarify what activities are authorized
during a moment of silence.
51. Id. at 56–57. The Court said legislative intent was clear because “[t]he sponsor
of the bill that became § 16-1-20.1, Senator Donald Holmes, inserted into the legislative
record—apparently without dissent—a statement indicating that the legislation was an
‘effort to return voluntary prayer’ to the public schools.” Id.
52. Id. at 59. The earlier version of the statute, § 16-1-20, stated, “a period of
silence, not to exceed one minute in duration, shall be observed for meditation.” Id. at
40 n.1. The statute at issue in this case, § 16-1-20.1, stated, “a period of silence not to
exceed one minute in duration shall be observed for meditation or voluntary prayer.” Id.
at 40 n.2 (emphasis added). Interestingly, in Elk Grove Unified School District v. Newdow,
there was only one significant textual difference between the Pledge of Allegiance as
originally written in 1892 and the Pledge of Allegiance as amended in 1954: the addition
of the words “under God” in 1954. 124 S. Ct. 2301, 2305–06 (2004), reh’g denied, 125
S. Ct. 21 (2004). There was a minor amendment made to the Pledge in the 1920s, where
“my Flag” was changed to “the flag of the United States of America.” Id. at 2305. In
1892, the Pledge was written as follows: “I pledge allegiance to my Flag and the
Republic for which it stands: one Nation indivisible, with Liberty and Justice for all.”
In 1954, the words “under God” were added to the Pledge so that it read: “I pledge
allegiance to the Flag of the United States of America, and to the Republic for which it
stands, one Nation under God, indivisible, with liberty and justice for all.” Id. at 2306.
Based on the Court’s rationale in Wallace v. Jaffree, one might expect the Supreme
Court in Elk Grove Unified School District v. Newdow to have concluded that the
addition of the words “under God” to the Pledge in 1954 indicated treatment of Christian
religions as favored religions in the United States. The majority in Newdow, however,
never reached the merits of the case. Id. at 2305. In contrast, Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justice O’Connor wrote concurring opinions discussing the constitutionality of the Pledge of
Allegiance. Id. at 2316–27. Both Justices concluded that the Pledge of Allegiance,
which includes the words “under God,” does not violate the Establishment Clause. Id. at
2312, 2323. Chief Justice Rehnquist reasoned that the addition of the words “under
God” to the Pledge was merely a recognition that “[f]rom the time of our earliest history
our peoples and our institutions have reflected the traditional concept that our Nation
was founded on a fundamental belief in God.” Id. at 2320 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 1693,
83d Cong., 2d Sess., 2 (1954)). Similarly, Justice O’Connor concluded that the words
“under God” are mere “ceremonial deism,” see supra note 5, based on four factors:
history and ubiquity, absence of worship or prayer, absence of reference to particular
religion, and minimal religious content. Id. at 2323–27.
53. Wallace, 472 U.S. at 60.
54. Id. at 85 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
55. Id.
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Which effect is truly primary makes an enormous difference because
it affects the determination of whether or not the statute violates the
Establishment Clause. Under the majority’s view, the statute violated
the Establishment Clause, but under Burger’s view, the statute would not
violate the Establishment Clause.56 It is not helpful to employ a test
whose results hinge on a subjective factor that is difficult to ascertain,
such as the primary or principal effect of a statute. If reasonable minds
differ as to the primary or principal effect of a given statute, act, or
display, can it really be said that the statute, act, or display has a primary
or principal effect at all? The primary or principal effect thus seems to
depend upon the perception of the majority of people, or at least the
majority of Supreme Court Justices. This is further problematic because
a main goal of the Establishment Clause is to protect the beliefs of those
in the religious minority from those in the religious majority.57
Finally, the Lemon test requires that the statute, act, or display must
not foster excessive government entanglement with religion. The primary
problem with this prong is ascertaining the definition of “excessive.”58
56. Id. at 61.
57. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687–88 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
Whose perceptions, then, should count in this type of inquiry? There are two options,
better seen in the context of the endorsement test, which will be taken up in the next
section. See infra notes 82–91 and accompanying text. For now, it is enough to say that
it is inherently contradictory to proclaim that a statute, act, or display has a certain
principal or primary effect when not everyone examining the statute, act, or display
perceives the same principal or primary effect.
58. The Court has discussed what should be examined to determine whether or not
a particular practice is “excessive,” but has not discussed what degree of governmental
involvement with religion qualifies as “excessive.” For example, in Walz v. Tax Commission,
397 U.S. 664, 675 (1970), the Court noted that “the questions are whether the involvement is
excessive, and whether it is a continuing one calling for official and continuing surveillance
leading to an impermissible degree of entanglement.” Further, in Lemon v. Kurtzman,
403 U.S. 602, 615 (1971), the Court stated, “[i]n order to determine whether the
government entanglement with religion is excessive, we must examine the character and
purposes of the institutions that are benefited, the nature of the aid that the State
provides, and the resulting relationship between the government and the religious
authority.” Finally, in Lynch, the Court said, “[e]ntanglement is a question of kind and
degree. In this case, however, there is no reason to disturb the District Court’s finding
on the absence of administrative entanglement.” 465 U.S. at 684. This is because there
was no evidence that the city contacted church authorities regarding the content and
design of the display, no maintenance expenses were necessary, and “[i]n many respects
the display require[d] far less ongoing, day-to-day interaction between church and state
than religious paintings in public galleries.” Id. These explanations of whether or not a
particular practice constitutes excessive government entanglement with religion seem to
cast the definition of “excessive” in the light of “I’ll know it when I see it,” as opposed to
describing factors or guidelines indicating what degree of involvement is in fact “excessive.”
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Is the government required to set itself outside of religious affairs
altogether (a complete “hands-off” approach)? May it acknowledge religion?
May it make accommodations for religious practices? A complete hands-off
approach is an impossible goal when the Free Exercise Clause prevents
Congress from prohibiting the free exercise of religion.59 If the government
must protect the religious freedoms of its individual citizens, it cannot
remain completely outside of religious affairs.60 It thus appears that it is
at least acceptable for government to acknowledge religion, but may
government also make accommodations for it?
The distinction between acknowledgment and accommodation, however,
may not always be substantial enough to distinguish between excessive
and nonexcessive government involvement. For example, if the government
provides that employees can be excused from work on their religious
days of Sabbath, is this an acknowledgment that some people are
religious and believe that certain days of the week are holy and should
therefore be devoted to God, not work?61 Or, is this an accommodation
of the religious beliefs of these citizens? If we say that government may
acknowledge religion, but may not accommodate it, how would the
government proceed in the above example? Even if we assume that
excusing employees from work is a mere acknowledgment of religion
(which, no doubt, many people would disagree with), is it so obvious
that the government would still not be excessively entangled with
religion? That is, in the government’s earnestness to ensure that it is only
acknowledging religion, it might closely monitor workplace practices to
make sure that acknowledgment of religion is not rising to the level of
religious accommodation. Would not, then, this close monitoring be
considered excessive entanglement?62 Thus, the government has the dilemma
of not being able to exempt itself from religious involvement, while
also running the risk that mere acknowledgment of religion could
59. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
60. See Jesse H. Choper, The Free Exercise Clause: A Structural Overview and an
Appraisal of Recent Developments, 27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 943, 947–48 (1986):
On the one hand, the Court has read the establishment clause as saying that if a
law’s purpose is to aid religion, it is unconstitutional. On the other hand, the
Court has read the free exercise clause as saying that, under certain
circumstances, the state must aid religion. Logically, the two theses are
irreconcilable.
61. Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm’n, 480 U.S. 136, 146 (1987)
(holding that Florida’s refusal to provide appellant with unemployment benefits violated
the Free Exercise Clause because “the State may not force an employee ‘to choose
between following the precepts of her religion and forfeiting benefits, . . . and
abandoning one of the precepts of her religion in order to accept work’”) (quoting
Sherbert v. Verner 374 U.S. 398, 404 (1963)).
62. E.g., Roemer v. Bd. of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 768–69 (1976) (White, J.,
concurring) (saying the entanglement prong is “insolubly paradoxical”).
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simultaneously be excessive entanglement with religion.
As demonstrated above, all three prongs of the Lemon test contain
inherent flaws that prevent the test from being practically workable in a
satisfactory manner. Application of the Lemon test in actual cases has
also failed. For example, in Aguilar v. Felton,63 use of the Lemon test
completely failed in its goal of providing government neutrality with
respect to religion.64 Although the Lemon analysis does not require that
all three prongs be violated for a practice to be deemed unconstitutional,
this is precisely one of the problems with the Lemon test, and is
especially evident in Aguilar.65 Application of the Lemon test to the
facts of Aguilar resulted in the disturbing conclusion that government
aid to underprivileged children violated the First Amendment, although
it was never established that the purpose of the aid was religious in
nature or that the aid itself had the effect of advancing religion. Indeed,
the program was deemed unconstitutional because of the government’s
desire to assure that the program was not associated with religion.66 For
these reasons, the Lemon test ought to be abandoned.

63. 473 U.S. 402 (1985).
64. In Aguilar, the Court struck down a New York program authorizing the
Secretary of Education to provide financial assistance to local schools, including
parochial schools, to meet the needs of educationally deprived children from low-income
families. Id. at 404, 414. Public school personnel volunteered to run the program, and
were told to “avoid involvement with religious activities . . . conducted within the private
schools and to bar religious materials in their classrooms.” Id. at 406–07. The program
was nevertheless held unconstitutional because it fostered excessive government
entanglement with religion, even though there was no discussion that the program was
exclusively motivated by nonsecular purposes or that it had the effect of advancing
religion. Id. at 409.
65. In Aguilar, there was no evidence that the program was inspired by religious
motives or that the program had the effect of advancing religion. In fact, the program
was held unconstitutional because the state surveillance needed to ensure that religion
did not pervade the program would have been “excessive.” Id. at 413. Chief Justice
Burger addressed this issue, stating, “[w]hat is disconcerting about the result reached
today is that . . . the Court does not even attempt to identify any threat to religious
liberty . . . .” Id. at 419 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). Chief Justice Burger went on to say
that the Court’s duty is not to mechanically apply formulas, but rather is to “determine
whether the statute or practice at issue is a step toward establishing a state religion.
Federal programs designed to prevent a generation of children from growing up without
being able to read effectively are not remotely steps in that direction.” Id.
66. This is anomalous and undesirable, but is not the only example of the failure of
the Lemon test in practical application. Additional cases in which employing the Lemon
test has failed will be discussed infra Part II.
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B. The Endorsement Test
The endorsement test focuses primarily on the first and second prongs
of the Lemon test. This test asks what the government’s actual purpose
was in passing a particular statute, erecting a certain display, or engaging
in a specific act, and then asks what the effect of the statute, display, or
act is, regardless of the government’s actual purpose.67 This test was set
forth in Justice O’Connor’s concurring opinion in Lynch v. Donnelly.68
O’Connor suggested this test as a clarification of current Establishment
Clause jurisprudence because it was unclear to her how the Lemon test
protected the principle of prohibiting impermissible government interaction
with religion guaranteed by the First Amendment.69 O’Connor stated
that to determine whether or not there has been unconstitutional
government action with respect to religion, one must examine what the
government intended to communicate, as well as what message was
actually conveyed.70 This inquiry forms the two-pronged analysis that is
the endorsement test.
1. Arguments Supporting Use of the Endorsement Test
One positive aspect of this test is that it emphasizes that the
government should not communicate that anyone is either an “insider”
or an “outsider” on account of his or her religious beliefs.71 In connection
with prohibiting the government from placing a badge of inferiority on
some of its citizens, the endorsement test also seeks to assure government
neutrality toward all religions in a culturally diverse society.72 This
neutrality that the endorsement test seeks is consistent with the mandates
of the First Amendment because it requires respect for different beliefs.73
67. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 690 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
O’Connor formulates the endorsement test as follows:
The purpose prong of the Lemon test asks whether [the] government’s actual
purpose is to endorse or disapprove of religion. The effect prong asks whether,
irrespective of [the] government’s actual purpose, the practice under review in
fact conveys a message of endorsement or disapproval. An affirmative answer
to either question should render the challenged practice invalid.
Id.
68. Id. at 687.
69. Id. at 687–89.
70. Id. at 690.
71. See Arnold H. Loewy, Rethinking Government Neutrality Towards Religion
Under the Establishment Clause: The Untapped Potential of Justice O’Connor’s Insight,
64 N.C. L. REV. 1049, 1051 (1986).
72. Id.
73. Christopher S. Nesbit, Note, County of Allegheny v. ACLU: Justice
O’Connor’s Endorsement Test, 68 N.C. L. REV. 590, 611 (1990) (stating that, at a
minimum, the Establishment Clause requires that the government not prefer one
religious sect or creed over another because “the first amendment has always required
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The endorsement test is also commendable because it allows the
government to make certain accommodations for both minority and
mainstream religions.74 Additionally, the endorsement test’s rejection of
government acts communicating that certain citizens are outsiders appeals
to humane instincts.75 Finally, the Supreme Court has adopted the
endorsement test as “a sound analytical framework.”76 In County of
Allegheny v. ACLU, the Court formally adopted the endorsement test,
even though the Lemon test (as applied in Lynch v. Donnelly regarding a
holiday display) was controlling law at the time.77
2. Arguments Against Use of the Endorsement Test
Despite this support, there are three main flaws inherent in the
endorsement test. First, what type of endorsement does the test refer to?
complete respect for religious diversity in society”). Respect for religious diversity is
not achieved when the government does not act neutrally toward religion because the
government “cannot endorse the religious practices and beliefs of some citizens without
sending a clear message to nonadherents that they are outsiders or less than full members
of the political community.” Id.
74. Jesse H. Choper, The Endorsement Test: Its Status and Desirability, 18 J.L. &
POL. 499, 501, 508 (2002). Governmental accommodations of religion are not permitted
under the Lemon test because the goal of accommodations is to avoid burdening
religious activity, making it difficult to say that assisting religion is not the purpose of
these accommodations. Id. at 501. Yet, the Court has required religious exemptions
under the Free Exercise Clause and has even approved of some accommodations that are
not constitutionally required. Id. For example, the Court has held that religious
conscientious objectors can be excused from military service, see Selective Draft Law
Cases, 245 U.S. 366, 389–90 (1918), that Amish schoolchildren can be excused from
compulsory education laws, see Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 207 (1972), and that
while exemption from a Sunday Closing law for Orthodox Jews is not constitutionally
required, such treatment is permissible, see Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 608–09
(1961). Id. Choper contends that these accommodations should be constitutional because
“[i]t reasons that relieving burdens that generally applicable regulations impose on
members of some faiths neither ‘endorses’ those religions, nor makes nonbelievers nor
members of the non-benefited religions feel they have been disparaged because of their
faith.” Id. at 508–09.
75. Id. at 509.
76. County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 595 (1989).
77. Id. at 597 (“Since Lynch, the Court has made clear that . . . we must ascertain
whether ‘the challenged governmental action is sufficiently likely to be perceived by
adherents of the controlling denominations as an endorsement, and by the nonadherents
as a disapproval, of their individual religious choices.’”) (quoting Sch. Dist. v. Ball, 473
U.S. 373, 390 (1985)); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 685 (1984) (holding that “the
city has a secular purpose for including the crèche, that the city has not impermissibly
advanced religion, and that including the crèche does not create excessive entanglement
between religion and government”).
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Second, how do we ascertain government intent? Finally, whose views count
in the perception that government has endorsed or disapproved of religion?78
The first difficulty with the endorsement test is determining the
prohibited types of endorsement. The government can engage in exclusive
preferment endorsement, endorsement of truthfulness, endorsement of
value, or accommodation endorsement.79 While it may seem intuitive
that exclusive preferment endorsement by the government should always
be prohibited by the Establishment Clause, it is less clear whether or not
endorsements of value or accommodation endorsements should be
violations.80 If we cannot even distinguish which type of endorsement is
appropriate from which type of endorsement is inappropriate, how is the
“endorsement” test supposed to work? This inherent flaw eliminates the
usefulness of the endorsement test in and of itself, but there are still
other problems with the test.
78. Smith, supra note 39, at 291. Determining what type of endorsement the
endorsement test refers to is difficult because endorsement connotes approval, but
approval may take various forms. Id. at 276. Deciding whose perceptions count in the
perception that the government has either endorsed or disapproved of religion is also
difficult because we do not know whether it is the perceptions of real human beings or
the perceptions of the hypothetical “objective observer” that count. Id. at 291–92.
79. Id. at 276–77. Exclusive preferment endorsement refers to the notion that
believers of different religious faiths assume that not all religions can be correct because
they differ in their doctrines, practices, and claims to divine authority. Id. Thus, there
have been disputes over which religion is the true religion. Id. at 277. If the government
indicated that it accepted one particular religion as the true religion, it would be engaging
in exclusive preferment endorsement. Id. Endorsement of truthfulness refers to the
notion that the government could express that certain religious doctrines are true without
saying that a particular religion is the true religion. Id. Endorsement of value reflects
the idea that the government can express that religion is generally valuable because it
instills qualities of good citizenship or helps maintain civil peace. Id. Finally,
accommodation endorsement refers to the concept that the government can acknowledge
that many citizens care deeply about religion and that these religious concerns merit
respect and accommodation by the government. Id.
80. Id. at 278–83. Steven Smith posits several ways in which the concept of
endorsement can be made clearer, but concludes that none of the modifications is very
fulfilling. Id. For example, the government could prohibit all types of the
aforementioned variants of endorsement, but refusing to accommodate religious beliefs
may lead to disapproval of religion when the government often acknowledges and
accommodates various citizen interests, and this would be a violation of the
Establishment Clause. Id. at 278. The government could only permit accommodation
endorsements, but “the line separating accommodation endorsements from endorsements
of truthfulness or value is so thin as to be virtually invisible.” Id. at 279. The
government could permit accommodation endorsements and endorsements of value, but
then there are difficulties in allowing the government to say that religion is “good,” but
not that it is “true” because there is no reliable way of determining whether or not school
prayer, publicly sponsored nativity scenes, etc. indicate that the religious ideas they
represent are “good” or “true.” Id. at 282. Finally, the government could engage in
accommodation endorsements, value endorsements, and truthfulness endorsements, but
not engage in exclusive preferment endorsement. Id. at 282–83. The problem with this
alternative is that these endorsements would prohibit too little, and thus would not be
appealing to proponents of a no endorsement test. Id. at 283.
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A second difficulty with the endorsement test is the requirement of
ascertaining subjective legislative intent. This is the same difficulty that
appears under the Lemon test. The prior discussion regarding the problems
with subjective legislative intent also applies here to demonstrate why
discerning the intent of legislators is difficult, and not all that meaningful
even when it is determined.81
The final impediment to applying the endorsement test to Establishment
Clause cases is the problem of determining whose views count in the
perception that the government has either endorsed or disapproved of
religion. One possibility is to use a “real” person’s perception—that is,
if a real person would perceive that the government has endorsed or
disapproved of religion, then the act would violate the Establishment
Clause.82 Or, perhaps the perceptions of a “hypothetical objective observer”
should be used to determine whether the government has endorsed or
disapproved of religion.83 Should the perceptions of real people or the
hypothetical objective observer matter? Both options have inherent
problems.
If the perceptions of real people are to be protected under the
endorsement test, there are so many differing religions and religious
beliefs in the United States that practically anything the government
does could be seen by someone to be an endorsement or disapproval of
religion.84 This is a problem because allowing one person’s perceptions
of governmental endorsement or disapproval of religion to invalidate an

81. See supra notes 38–49 and accompanying text. It is not necessary to reiterate
the same intent problems under this test that appear in the Lemon test, except to say that
the intent problem is still present in the endorsement test, working against the test’s
usefulness for deciding Establishment Clause cases.
82. Justice O’Connor emphasizes the fact that “[e]ndorsement sends a message to
nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full members of the political community, and an
accompanying message to adherents that they are insiders, favored members of the
political community.” Lynch, 465 U.S. at 688 (O’Connor, J., concurring). This would
lead one to believe that the effect of endorsement upon “real” people is the primary
concern of the endorsement test.
83. Although Justice O’Connor stressed how governmental endorsement of
religion affects “real” people in Lynch, she stated in Wallace v. Jaffree that “[t]he
relevant issue is whether an objective observer, acquainted with the text, legislative
history, and implementation of the statute, would perceive it as a state endorsement . . . .”
Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 76 (1985) (O’Connor, J., concurring). From O’Connor’s
contradictory statements, it is not easy to discern whether the endorsement test is actually
concerned with the “hypothetical objective observer” or whether it focuses on “real”
people.
84. Smith, supra note 39, at 291.
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action would result in governmental paralysis.85 The First Amendment
is designed to protect the rights of all citizens and therefore cannot
logically stand for the proposition that if one person finds an action
offensive, the action must be invalidated.
On the other hand, it may be that only the perceptions of the “hypothetical
objective observer” are relevant. Adopting this view, however, results in
an inconsistency in the reasoning behind adopting the endorsement test
in the first place. The endorsement test was developed to prevent the
government from sending messages to nonbelievers that they are
outsiders.86 Yet, an objective observer would be familiar with the text,
legislative history, and implementation of the practice under review.87
Because he or she would thus possess the tools to know exactly what the
legislators intended, he or she will only perceive endorsement when
legislators intend to endorse.88
The same is not true of real people. Real people may perceive
endorsement where legislators did not intend to endorse, and real people
may not always perceive endorsement where legislators did intend to
endorse.89 The objective observer does not protect against making
citizens feel like outsiders in either of these situations. If real people do
not perceive endorsement where the legislature intended to endorse, then
they will not feel like outsiders (even though the objective observer
perceives an intent to endorse).90 In cases where “real” people perceive
an intent to endorse where no such legislative intent to endorse exists,
the “objective observer” would not protect these interests because the
“objective observer” would know that the legislators are not intending to
endorse; thus, the “objective observer” would not perceive endorsement.91
Determining which type of endorsement is prohibited under the
endorsement test is difficult, and ascertaining legislative intent is
virtually impossible. Furthermore, deciding whose perceptions count
leads to problems whether or not the perceptions of “real” people or the
“hypothetical objective observer” are adopted. For these reasons, the
endorsement test should not be utilized in Establishment Clause cases.

85. Id. Indeed, Justice O’Connor herself realizes this problem, noting: “Given the
dizzying religious heterogeneity of our Nation, adopting a subjective approach would
reduce the [endorsement] test to an absurdity.” Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow,
124 S. Ct. 2301, 2321 (2004), reh’g denied, 125 S. Ct. (2004).
86. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 688.
87. Wallace, 472 U.S. at 76 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
88. Smith, supra note 39, at 293–94.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 294–95.
91. Id. at 294.
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II. APPLICATION OF THE LEMON AND ENDORSEMENT TESTS
One of the most obvious ways in which the flaws of the Lemon and
endorsement tests can be seen is in their application to actual cases.
Even without the substantive criticisms outlined in Part I of this
Comment, simply looking at the holdings and reasoning of the cases
themselves shows the inadequacies of these tests. There are several
areas in which application of these tests yields inconsistent, and often
incoherent, results.92 Two primary examples are the holiday display
cases and the recent Ten Commandments cases.93 The results of these
cases are wildly inconsistent, demonstrating the inherent flaws of the
Lemon and endorsement tests.
A. Holiday Display Cases
In Lynch v. Donnelly, the Supreme Court held that the holiday display
of a crèche did not violate the Establishment Clause.94 In arriving at this
conclusion, the Supreme Court began by acknowledging that church and
state are not totally separable and that some relationship between the two
is inevitable.95
The Court then discussed that its interpretation of the Establishment
Clause is at least partially molded by “what history reveals was the

92. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
93. The holiday display cases include County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573
(1989) and Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984). The Ten Commandments cases are
composed of Glassroth v. Moore, 335 F.3d 1282 (11th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S.
1000 (2003), and Freethought Society v. Chester County, 334 F.3d 247 (3d Cir. 2003).
94. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 687. The city of Pawtucket, Rhode Island, erected a
Christmas display each year as part of its observance of the Christmas season. Id. at 671.
The display was erected in a park owned by a non-profit organization, located in the
heart of the shopping district, and was comprised of a Santa Claus house, reindeer,
candy-striped poles, a Christmas tree, carolers, a clown, an elephant, a teddy bear,
colored lights, a banner that read “Season’s Greetings,” and a crèche. Id. The crèche
consisted of figures of the Infant Jesus, Mary, Joseph, angels, shepherds, kings, and
animals, that ranged in height from five inches to five feet. Id. These detailed facts must
be included in the discussion because “the Court consistently has declined to take a rigid,
absolutist view of the Establishment Clause. . . . [T]he Court has scrutinized challenged
legislation or official conduct to determine whether, in reality, it establishes a religion or
religious faith, or tends to do so.” Id. at 678. In other words, the Court takes an ad hoc
approach with respect to Establishment Clause issues; each case is decided according to
its particular facts. Therefore, these specific facts must be included in the analysis of the
Establishment Clause issue because the outcome of the case turns on these details.
95. Id. at 672.
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contemporaneous understanding of its guarantees.”96 The Court pointed
to an act of the First Congress as indicative of what the Establishment
Clause was understood to mean when it was first written. The Court
noted that Congress approved the Establishment Clause and enacted
legislation providing for paid Chaplains for the House and Senate in the
same week.97 Thus, it was clear that neither the Framers nor the
Congress of 1789 viewed the employment of congressional Chaplains to
give daily prayers in Congress as an establishment problem.98
Moreover, all three branches of government have officially acknowledged
the role of religion in American life, from recognizing holidays with
religious significance, to the statutorily prescribed motto “In God We
Trust,” to “One Nation Under God” as part of the Pledge of Allegiance,
to art galleries supported by public revenues that display religious
paintings predominantly inspired by one religious faith.99
Acknowledging that some interaction between government and
religion must exist, the Court decided that the focus of its inquiry into
whether or not the crèche violated the Establishment Clause must be on
the crèche in the context of the Christmas season.100 This is because
focusing exclusively on the religious component of an activity would
lead to its invalidation under the Establishment Clause.101 In examining
the crèche in the context of the Christmas season, the Supreme Court
seemed to simply assume that the crèche was not equivalent to
governmental advocacy of religion. The Court stated that the city’s use
of the crèche was merely an act of acknowledging a significant historical
religious event that has long been celebrated in the western world.102
The Court maintained that celebrating and depicting the origins of this
holiday were legitimate secular purposes.103 Thus, the Court concluded
that the first prong of the Lemon test (that the statute, act, or display has
a secular legislative purpose) was met without much discussion.
The same is true regarding the Court’s analysis of the second prong of
the Lemon test (that the display’s principal or primary effect neither
advance nor inhibit religion). The Court said that this prong would not
be met unless display of the crèche were to be viewed as more of an
endorsement of religion than spending public money on textbooks for
96. Id. at 673. In other words, at least in this instance, the Supreme Court
considered, and perhaps gave greater weight to, the original intent of the Framers
regarding the First Amendment when deciding an Establishment Clause issue.
97. Id. at 674.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 674, 676.
100. Id. at 679.
101. Id. at 680.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 681.
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students attending church-sponsored schools, spending public money to
transport children to church-sponsored schools, or giving tax exemptions
to church properties.104
The Court concluded that whatever benefit a religion, or all religions,
received from displaying the crèche was merely indirect, remote, and
incidental.105 The Court arrived at this conclusion by finding that
display of the crèche did not advance or endorse religion any more than
the federal government’s recognition of Christmas or the exhibition of
religious paintings in governmentally supported museums.106 With this
conclusion, the Court drew a line between constitutional and unconstitutional
practices, but acknowledged that there is not necessarily one correct spot
at which this line should be drawn. This seemingly arbitrary line-drawing is
seen in the Court’s reluctance to hold that the display of the crèche
violated the First Amendment.107
The Court seems to convey that display of the crèche cannot be
unconstitutional because, if it were, a lot of other practices would have
to be declared unconstitutional; the Court was simply not willing to
arrive at this result. The Court did not really discuss why display of the
crèche in and of itself did not advance religion. It simply said that
display of the crèche, in relation to other constitutionally valid practices,
must also be constitutionally acceptable.108
104. Id. at 681–82. The Court apparently shifted the inquiry from whether or not
the crèche advances or inhibits religion to whether or not display of the crèche confers a
more substantial benefit to religion than other practices that the Court has upheld. The
Court, however, was honest about what it was doing. The majority acknowledged the
dissent’s argument that some observers might observe the crèche as the city aligning
itself with the Christian faith, but responded that “our precedents plainly contemplate that
on occasion some advancement of religion will result from governmental action. . . . ‘[N]ot
every law that confers an “indirect,” “remote,” or “incidental” benefit upon [religion] is,
for that reason alone, constitutionally invalid.’” Id. at 683 (quoting Comm. for Pub.
Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 771 (1973)).
105. Id. at 683.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 685.
108. Id. at 681–82; see Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 17 (1947) (holding that
New Jersey’s practice of utilizing tax-raised funds to reimburse parents for the cost of
sending their children to parochial school, when New Jersey also reimbursed parents
who sent their children to public and other schools, did not violate the First
Amendment). This case has never been overruled, but has been criticized as “out of line
with the First Amendment.” Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 443 (1962) (Douglas, J.,
concurring); see also Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 308, 312 (1952) (upholding a
New York City program that allowed public schools to release students during the school
day so that they could go to religious centers to receive religious instruction). This case
has not been overruled either, but it too has been criticized. Justice Harlan said that
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With respect to the third prong (that the display not foster excessive
government entanglement with religion), the Court noted that there was
no evidence that the city ever contacted church authorities regarding the
content or design of the display, the city did not have to spend money to
maintain the crèche, and the city itself owned the crèche.109 There was
nothing in the case resembling the “comprehensive, discriminating, and
continuing state surveillance . . . present in Lemon.”110 Therefore, the
Court held that display of the crèche did not foster excessive government
entanglement between religion and government.111
Although the Supreme Court upheld the display of the holiday crèche
in Lynch, it reached a conflicting result five years later in County of
Allegheny v. ACLU. The Court held that the display of a holiday crèche
in the Allegheny County Courthouse violated the Establishment Clause,
but that the display of a holiday menorah did not.112 The Supreme Court
Zorach is unsound to the extent that it permits the government to shape its secular
programs to accommodate the beliefs of religious groups because “legislation must, at
the very least, be neutral” to conform to the requirements of the First Amendment.
Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 360–61 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring). The
Court essentially said that the crèche in Lynch must be constitutional because the
practices in Everson and Zorach were constitutional. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 681–82. Yet,
because Everson and Zorach had been criticized before the Court ruled on the display in
Lynch, the Court should have addressed the continuing propriety of these practices in its
opinion.
109. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 684.
110. Id. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 607 (1971), involved a Pennsylvania
statute that provided financial support to nonpublic elementary and secondary schools by
reimbursing these schools for the cost of teachers’ salaries, textbooks, and instructional
materials in specified secular subjects and a Rhode Island statute under which the State
paid directly to teachers in nonpublic elementary schools a supplement of 15% of their
annual salary. The Rhode Island statute further required that “any teacher applying for a
salary supplement . . . first agree in writing ‘not to teach a course in religion for so long
as or during such time as he or she receives any salary supplements.’” Id. at 608. The
Court recognized, however, that ensuring that teachers at parochial schools who received
state supplements to their salaries did not incorporate religious instruction in their
classrooms would require “[a] comprehensive, discriminating, and continuing state
surveillance . . . to ensure that these restrictions are obeyed and the First Amendment
otherwise respected.” Id. at 619. The same type of continuing surveillance would apply
with respect to the Pennsylvania statute as the Pennsylvania statute “provide[d] state aid
to church-related schools for teachers’ salaries.” Id. at 620.
111. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 685.
112. County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 621 (1989). The crèche was
displayed on the Grand Staircase of the Allegheny County Courthouse during the
Christmas holiday season each year since 1981 by the Holy Name Society, a Roman
Catholic group. Id. at 579. The crèche included figures of the infant Jesus, Mary,
Joseph, farm animals, shepherds, and wise men, and also included an angel bearing a
banner that proclaimed “Gloria in Excelsis Deo!” Id. at 580. The display also contained
a plaque indicating it was donated by the Holy Name Society. Id. The county placed red
and white poinsettia plants around the fence, together with a small evergreen tree
decorated with a red bow, but no figures of Santa Claus or other decorations were
included. Id. at 580–81. The Court recognized that the effect of a crèche display turns
on its setting, thus the particular facts and details surrounding the crèche are of particular
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concluded that the crèche display was a violation of the Establishment
Clause because it demonstrated the county’s endorsement of Christianity.113
The Court began its analysis by recognizing that a crèche is capable of
communicating a religious message.114 Yet, the Court distinguished the
crèche in this case from the crèche in Lynch by saying that nothing in the
context of the display in this case detracted from the crèche’s religious
message, while such items as Santa’s house and reindeer drew attention
away from the crèche itself in Lynch.115 The notion that either the
presence of figurines of Santa Claus or other decorations elsewhere in
the courthouse or the presence of flowers surrounding the crèche detracted
from the crèche’s religious message was rejected in Allegheny.116 The
Court emphasized the fact that the crèche was located on the Grand
Staircase, “the ‘main’ and ‘most beautiful’ part of the building that is the
seat of county government.”117 According to the Court, no viewer would
reasonably think that the crèche would be placed in such a location
without the support and approval of the government, despite the fact that
a sign appeared next to the crèche indicating that a Roman Catholic
organization owned the crèche.118 Instead of viewing the sign as an
announcement that the display was sponsored by a religious organization,
the Court saw the sign as a governmental endorsement of the religious
organization’s message.119
The Court distinguished Allegheny from Lynch on the facts.120 The
factual differences, however, are not necessarily persuasive. First, the
Court said that nothing detracted from the religious message of the

importance and must be included in any analysis of the constitutionality of such a
display. Id. at 597.
113. Id. at 612–13.
114. Id. at 598.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 598–99.
117. Id. at 599.
118. Id. at 599–600.
119. Id. at 600.
120. The Court stated that Lynch stands for the proposition that the government may
celebrate Christmas, but not in a way that endorses Christianity. Id. at 601. The Court
then stated that Allegheny County crossed the boundaries delineated in Lynch by
celebrating “Christmas in a way that has the effect of endorsing a patently Christian
message: Glory to God for the birth of Jesus Christ.” Id. With this statement, the Court
acknowledged that the holdings of Lynch and Allegheny were different, but that there
was a valid reason for this difference; the display in Lynch was within the bounds of the
First Amendment, but the display in Allegheny fell outside the permissible practices of
the First Amendment. Id.
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crèche in Allegheny, while secular decorations drew attention away from
the crèche’s religious symbolism in Lynch.121 The problem with this
purported factual distinction between the two cases is that nothing in the
Lynch opinion referred to secular objects detracting from the crèche’s
religious message as a factor in declaring the crèche to be constitutional.122
Rather, the Court stated that it was not seeking to explain away the
religious nature of the crèche, nor was it equating the crèche with a
Santa’s house or reindeer.123 Second, the Court emphasized the location

121. See supra notes 94 & 112 and accompanying text.
122. Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 666 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part):
Crucial to the Court’s conclusion was not the number, prominence, or type of
secular items contained in the holiday display but the simple fact that, when
displayed by government during the Christmas season, a crèche presents no
realistic danger of moving government down the forbidden road toward an
establishment of religion.
Some might argue that Lynch never addressed these secular objects because the Court
utilized the Lemon test and found that display of the crèche did not advance religion.
The argument would continue by saying that this is not the same inquiry that took place
in Allegheny. The Court focused on governmental endorsement of religion in Allegheny,
as opposed to advancement of religion, making examination of secular objects necessary
to determine how the presence of secular objects would affect a perception of
governmental endorsement of religion. A response to this argument is that application of
either test should lead to the same result. See, e.g., Daniel O. Conkle, Lemon Lives,
43 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 865, 874 (1993) (stating that “[t]he endorsement language of
Justice O’Connor . . . is fully consistent with the essence of Lemon”). Thus, if the two
tests are consistent with one another, one might assume that they strive to achieve the
same underlying goals and should therefore provide consistent results in practice. Some
might, however, argue that while it would be desirable for application of either test to
lead to consistent results, Justice O’Connor did not necessarily intend for application of
the endorsement test to always achieve the same results that application of the Lemon
test would achieve. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687–89 (1984) (O’Connor, J.,
concurring). O’Connor recognized:
The Establishment Clause prohibits government from making adherence to a
religion relevant in any way to a person’s standing in the political community.
Government can run afoul of that prohibition in two principal ways. One is
excessive entanglement with religious institutions . . . . The second and more
direct infringement is government endorsement or disapproval of religion. . . .
Our prior cases have used the three-part test articulated in Lemon v.
Kurtzman as a guide to detecting these two forms of unconstitutional
government action. It has never been entirely clear, however, how the three
parts of the test relate to the principles enshrined in the Establishment Clause.
Id. (citations omitted). This statement seems to indicate that the endorsement test is
necessary because the Lemon test may not adequately protect Establishment Clause
principles. Accordingly, application of the endorsement test might produce different
results than would application of the Lemon test, but, according to O’Connor, this would
be desirable. Also, O’Connor states that her suggested approach “leads to the same
result in this case” as does application of the Lemon test. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 687
(emphasis added). This implies that her endorsement analysis might not always lead to
the same conclusions that application of the Lemon analysis would.
123. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 685 n.12.
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of the crèche.124 The location of the crèche, just like the secular objects
accompanying the display, is not mentioned anywhere in the Lynch
opinion.125 In Lynch, the Court simply emphasized that the crèche had
to be viewed in the context of the Christmas season.126 Finally, the
entity that owned the crèche was another distinguishing factor that the
Court focused on in Allegheny.127 If this distinction were truly factually
relevant, it would seem to cut in favor of the crèche in Allegheny being
declared constitutional, as opposed to unconstitutional.128
Another difference between Allegheny and Lynch is that the Supreme
Court applied the endorsement test in Allegheny, but applied the Lemon
test in Lynch.129 Applying two different tests may have led to the two
different results in Allegheny and Lynch. It is unclear, however, whether
the results would have been different had the Court applied the same
test.
What is clear is that it would be most desirable to be able to employ
either test and still achieve the same results.130 This is true for at least
124. See supra notes 94 & 112 and accompanying text.
125. Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 666 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
126. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 680; see also Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 665–66 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
127. See supra notes 94 & 112 and accompanying text.
128. This is because the crèche in Lynch was owned by the city of Pawtucket, while
the crèche in Allegheny was owned by a Roman Catholic organization. See Allegheny,
492 U.S. at 667 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“Nor can I
comprehend why it should be that placement of a government-owned crèche on private
land is lawful while placement of a privately-owned crèche on public land is not.”).
129. The language of Allegheny demonstrates this difference. The majority opinion
concluded that the crèche demonstrated that the county endorsed Christianity. The
majority was quite clear about employing the endorsement test as opposed to the Lemon
test when it stated, “our present task is to determine whether the display of the crèche
and the menorah, in their respective ‘particular physical settings,’ has the effect of
endorsing or disapproving religious beliefs.” Id. at 597. The majority was less clear,
however, about why it used the endorsement test as opposed to the Lemon test. The
majority mentioned that the general principles espoused by the five Justices in
concurrence and dissent in Lynch “are sound, and have been adopted by the Court in
subsequent cases.” Id. Thus, while it is clear that the Supreme Court has utilized the
endorsement test since O’Connor first proposed it in her concurring opinion in Lynch,
and it is clear that the Supreme Court decided to use the endorsement test in Allegheny, it
is not entirely clear why the Supreme Court chose to employ the endorsement test in this
case and whether or not it will exclusively rely on the endorsement test in future cases.
130. One purpose of court decisions is to state what is acceptable behavior in
certain areas so that people may act accordingly. If court decisions are inconsistent or do
not clearly differentiate between what is acceptable and unacceptable behavior, people
will not understand how to conduct themselves in particular situations and litigation will
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three reasons. First, both the Lemon and endorsement tests are good law
and can be used at any time in current Establishment Clause cases.
Second, the Supreme Court did not indicate in Allegheny that it was
undergoing a shift in policy or goals, or that it viewed Establishment
Clause issues differently than it did when Lynch was decided, requiring
use of the endorsement test to achieve objectives that it could not meet
with the Lemon test. Finally, the notion of “endorsement” has largely
been absorbed into Lemon’s second prong.131 If endorsement is seen as
one way in which the government advances religion, it would seem that
application of the endorsement test should lead to the same result as if
the Lemon test were employed.
Perhaps even more compelling than these inconsistencies and
contradictions between cases, however, are the inconsistencies and
contradictions within cases. Such was the situation in Allegheny, as the
display of a crèche was held to be a violation of the Establishment
Clause, but the display of a menorah was not.132
The Court began its discussion of the constitutionality of the menorah
by noting that it was the “primary visual symbol for a holiday that, like
Christmas, has both religious and secular dimensions.”133 The Court
then noted that the tree was clearly the predominant element in the city’s
display.134 It was at this point that the logic of the Court’s opinion began
to falter. The Court declared that the tree dominated the display and that
Christmas trees, unlike menorahs, are not inherently religious symbols

continue indefinitely until a clearer framework is provided. For the sake of consistency
and predictability, it would not be good public policy for the Supreme Court to employ
multiple tests that could result in drastically different holdings.
131. See Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 592. The Court noted that the Lemon test has been
regularly applied in Establishment Clause cases, but that recent decisions “have refined
the definition of governmental action that unconstitutionally advances religion. In recent
years, we have paid particularly close attention to whether the challenged governmental
practice either has the purpose or effect of ‘endorsing’ religion . . . .” Id.
132. Id. at 621. About one block from the courthouse, a display consisted of a
forty-five-foot Christmas tree, an eighteen-foot menorah, and a sign that read “During
this holiday season, the city of Pittsburgh salutes liberty. Let these festive lights remind
us that we are the keepers of the flame of liberty and our legacy of freedom.” Id. at 582,
587. The menorah was owned by a Jewish group, but was stored, set up, and taken down
by the city every year. Id. at 587.
133. Id. at 613–14.
134. Id. at 617. The problem with this statement is that the Court assumes that
simply because the tree is forty-five feet high, while the menorah is only eighteen feet
high, the tree must be the predominant element in the display. This is not necessarily the
case. As Justice Brennan notes, it is entirely possible that the sight of an eighteen-foot
menorah would be “far more eye catching than that of a rather conventionally sized
Christmas tree. It also seems to me likely that the symbol with the more singular
message [in this case the menorah] will predominate over one lacking such a clear
meaning.” Id. at 642 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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because they typify the secular celebration of Christmas.135 From these
statements, the Court reached the conclusion that the display communicated
a secular celebration of Christmas and portrayed Chanukah as an
alternative tradition.136
This quasi-syllogism is, however, flawed. The Court basically operated
under the major premise that the Christmas tree was the dominant
element of the display. The minor premise was that the Christmas tree
was a secular symbol. The conclusion was that because the dominant
element was a secular one, the entire display must have been secular in
nature. This logic is severely impaired. It is not reasonable to say that
the display should be interpreted in light of the Christmas tree simply
because the Christmas tree was the largest symbol.137 The Court
recognized that a menorah is a religious symbol, but found it implausible
to perceive the display of the tree, sign, and menorah as an endorsement
of Judaism alone.138

135. Id. at 616.
136. Id. at 618.
137. See supra note 134.
138. Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 616 n.64. The Court’s reasoning as to why this
interpretation is “distinctly implausible” is puzzling. The Court noted that during the
time of the litigation, only 45,000 of Pittsburgh’s 387,000 people were Jewish. Id.
Whether or not a display violates the Establishment Clause, however, is not related to the
percentage of the population who subscribe to a particular faith. That is, Pittsburgh
could violate the Establishment Clause by endorsing Judaism, and not Christianity,
regardless of the number of Jewish people in the city. The Court acknowledged this
much by saying that Pittsburgh might endorse a minority faith by displaying a menorah
alone. Id. The mention of the Jewish population is, therefore, irrelevant and confusing.
What is more confusing, though, is the Court’s statement that “[w]hen a city like
Pittsburgh places a symbol of Chanukah next to a symbol of Christmas, the result may be
a simultaneous endorsement of Christianity and Judaism . . . . But the city’s addition of
a visual representation of Chanukah to its pre-existing Christmas display cannot
reasonably be understood as an endorsement of Jewish—yet not Christian—belief.” Id.
This is an odd statement considering the fact that the Court states that Christmas trees are
secular symbols of the Christmas holiday. Id. at 616–17. If a Christmas display simply
acknowledges the secular aspects of the holiday by including a secular symbol (in this
case, the Christmas tree), it is reasonable that the addition of a menorah could result in
the display being understood as an endorsement of Jewish belief, but not as an
endorsement of Christian belief. Even more troubling is the Court’s assertion that the
respective sizes of the tree and menorah cause the menorah’s meaning to depend upon
the meaning of the Christmas tree. Size of the symbols alone, however, need not be the
determining factor. See supra note 134. Furthermore, one can easily think of a display
where a forty-five-foot Christmas tree is surrounded by many smaller, yet highly
religious, symbols. In such a case, it would not be so simple to say that because the tree
remains the largest element in the display, then naturally the whole display must be
secular in nature.
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The Court also seemed to assume, without much discussion, that a
Christmas tree is an entirely secular symbol.139 Although it may be true
that Christmas trees have lost some of their religious significance over
the years, especially when coupled with the notions of gift-giving and
Santa Claus in contemporary life, this does not mean that Christmas
trees are always secular and are not capable of being religious
symbols.140 Also, given the religious symbolism of the menorah, it is
reasonable that an observer might believe that the government is
promoting both the Christian and Jewish religions.141 Yet, the Court
rejected this possibility by saying that a predominantly secular symbol
of Chanukah does not exist, so including a menorah is the city’s only
real option.142 The Court came to this conclusion because it said that an
eighteen-foot dreidel would look out of place in a holiday display and
might be interpreted as mocking Chanukah.143 It is unclear why use of
an eighteen-foot dreidel would certainly be inappropriate, while use of
an eighteen-foot menorah is permissible.144
The factual distinctions that the Court said existed between the
crèches in Lynch and Allegheny, as well as the distinctions between the
crèche and the menorah within Allegheny are not too compelling. The
contrary holdings of Lynch and Allegheny, therefore, reflect inherent
problems in both tests because application of either the endorsement test
or the Lemon test should lead to the same result. Thus, the endorsement
and Lemon tests should be abandoned.

139. “Although Christmas trees once carried religious connotations, today they
typify the secular celebration of Christmas. . . . Numerous Americans place Christmas
trees in their homes without subscribing to Christian religious beliefs . . . .” Id. at 616–17.
140. In fact, if one were to “[c]onsider a poster featuring a star of David, a statue of
Buddha, a Christmas tree, a mosque, and a drawing of Krishna . . . [there could] be no
doubt that, when found in such company, the tree serves as an unabashedly religious
symbol.” Id. at 641 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
141. The majority acknowledged that the city used a religious symbol, the menorah,
as its representation of Chanukah. The majority also acknowledged that the city did not
have reasonable alternatives that were less religious in nature. Id. at 618.
142. Id. at 613–14. The Court stated that “the menorah’s message is not exclusively
religious. The menorah is the primary visual symbol for a holiday that, like Christmas,
has both religious and secular dimensions.” Id.
143. Id. at 618.
144. The Court completely dismissed the possible use of the dreidel, a more secular
symbol of Chanukah, by saying that some people might interpret an eighteen-foot dreidel
as mocking the celebration of Chanukah. Id. Although this might be true, there is no
discussion as to who would perceive an eighteen-foot dreidel in this manner or why the
dreidel might be perceived in such a way. It is not unreasonable that some people might
indeed perceive an eighteen-foot menorah as mocking the celebration of Chanukah. It is
problematic for the Court to reach such conclusions without more discussion on the
matter.
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B. Ten Commandments Cases
The same inconsistency that is present in the holiday display cases
also exists in the recent Ten Commandments cases.145 At first glance,
there is a circuit split regarding whether or not display of the Ten
Commandments on public land violates the Establishment Clause, as the
Third Circuit recently held that a plaque of the Ten Commandments
above a courthouse entrance did not violate the Establishment Clause,
but the Eleventh Circuit found that display of a monument of the Ten
Commandments in a courthouse rotunda did violate the Establishment
Clause.146
There may not, however, be a circuit split at all.147 Because the factual
surroundings of each display are of prime importance in determining
Establishment Clause cases, it is possible that some displays would be
violations of the Establishment Clause while other displays would not.
Since each display is considered on an ad hoc basis, the specific
circumstances surrounding each display could lead to different results.148
However, an examination of the facts suggests that the application of the
Lemon and endorsement tests, not the factual differences surrounding the
displays of the Ten Commandments, is the cause of the inconsistent
145. Although the issue of whether or not plaques of the Ten Commandments can
be placed on public grounds is not itself recent, this comment focuses on two recent
cases: Freethought Society v. Chester County, 334 F.3d 247 (3d Cir. 2003) and
Glassroth v. Moore, 335 F.3d 1282 (11th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1000 (2003).
For older cases regarding this issue, see Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 41 (1980)
(holding that “Kentucky’s statute requiring the posting of the Ten Commandments in
public school rooms has no secular legislative purpose, and is therefore unconstitutional”) and
Anderson v. Salt Lake City Corp., 475 F.2d 29, 34 (10th Cir. 1973) (holding that a
monument of the Ten Commandments on courthouse grounds does not violate the
Establishment Clause).
146. Compare Freethought, 334 F.3d at 270 (holding that a plaque of the Ten
Commandments displayed at an old entrance to the courthouse does not violate the
Establishment Clause), with Glassroth, 335 F.3d at 1285, 1297 (holding that display of a
monument of the Ten Commandments in the courthouse rotunda violates the
Establishment Clause), Ind. Civil Liberties Union v. O’Bannon, 259 F.3d 766, 768–69,
772 (7th Cir. 2001) (holding that display of a monument of the Ten Commandments
together with the Bill of Rights and the Indiana Constitution Preamble on state
government property impermissibly endorses religion), and Adland v. Russ, 307 F.3d 471,
489 (6th Cir. 2002) (holding that display of a monument containing the Ten
Commandments on Capitol grounds violates the Establishment Clause), reh’g en banc
denied, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 25524 (6th Cir. Nov. 22, 2002), cert. denied, 583 U.S.
999 (2003).
147. See Duffy, supra note 6.
148. See supra notes 94 & 112 and accompanying text.
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results.
In Freethought Society v. Chester County,149 the Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit decided that a plaque above an old entrance to the
Chester County Courthouse displaying the Ten Commandments was
constitutional.150 The court began by determining the proper Establishment
Clause framework, and recognized that it must either apply the Lemon
test or the subsequent endorsement test which modifies and explains
it.151 The court chose to apply the endorsement test, apparently because
this is what recent Supreme Court decisions had done.152
In applying the endorsement test, the court considered the effect of the
display on the reasonable observer, rather than the County’s purpose in
erecting the display.153 With respect to the reasonable observer, the
149. 334 F.3d at 247.
150. Id. at 270. The Chester County Courthouse accepted a plaque displaying the
Ten Commandments from a religious group in 1920. Id. at 249. The plaque was placed
near the entrance to the Courthouse and remained in that location for over eighty years.
Id. at 249–50. During that time, the County never did anything to draw attention to,
celebrate, or maintain the plaque, but visitors to the Courthouse did pass the plaque on
their way into the Courthouse. Id. at 250. That entrance has since been closed and
visitors now enter the Courthouse via a new entrance, approximately seventy feet north
of the plaque. Id. Visitors to the courthouse can see the title of the plaque, “The
Commandments,” when walking on the sidewalk near the old entrance, but cannot see
the text of the plaque unless they explicitly walk up to the old entrance. Id.
151. Id. at 256. The court noted that the Lemon test has been criticized by Supreme
Court Justices. See Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 319 (2000)
(Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting); County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 655–56
(1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Comm. for Pub. Educ. &
Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646, 671–72 (1980) (Stevens, J., dissenting);
Books v. City of Elkhart, 235 F.3d 292 (7th Cir. 2000). Despite these criticisms, Lemon
has never been overruled.
152. Freethought, 334 F.3d at 258. “Recent Supreme Court decisions . . . have not
applied the Lemon test. Instead . . . the Court has applied the endorsement test developed
by Justice O’Connor, which dispenses with the ‘entanglement’ prong of the Lemon test
and collapses its ‘purpose’ and ‘effect’ prongs into a single inquiry.” Id. (quoting
Tenafly Eruv Ass’n v. Borough of Tenafly, 309 F.3d 144, 174 (3d Cir. 2002), cert.
denied, 539 U.S. 942 (2003)). It is unclear as to whether there were any compelling
reasons for the court to choose to apply the endorsement test over the Lemon test, other
than recent criticism of the Lemon test. See supra notes 130–31 and accompanying text,
discussing that application of both tests should lead to the same result, thus application
of one test over the other should not be viewed as a “better” course of action. See also
supra Part I (outlining the inherent problems of both the Lemon and endorsement tests,
resulting in the conclusion that neither formulation should be applied, in its current form,
to Establishment Clause analysis).
153. Freethought, 334 F.3d at 261. This is problematic for a couple of reasons.
First, the endorsement test is a two-part test inquiring into the government’s actual
purpose in passing a particular statute, erecting a certain display, or engaging in a
specific act, as well as inquiring into the effect of the statute, display, or act, regardless
of the government’s actual purpose. Therefore, on the face of the endorsement test,
ascertaining legislative intent is necessary. However, see supra Part I.A.2 regarding the
difficulty of determining legislative intent and questioning the usefulness of doing so in
the first place. Second, the court’s action of ignoring the County’s purpose highlights
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court adopted Justice O’Connor’s view that reasonable observers are
presumed to have an understanding of the general history of the display
and the community in which it is displayed.154
Within this framework, the court acknowledged that it could not
“ignore the inherently religious message of the Ten Commandments.”155
Despite the religious content of the plaque, the court said that the context
surrounding the religious display could make it so that the overall
display does not endorse religion.156 In Freethought, the court said that
the age and history of the Ten Commandments plaque, not the objects
surrounding it, changed the meaning such that an ordinarily religious
plaque did not endorse religion in this instance.157 The court therefore
decided that while a reasonable observer, in the abstract, might perceive
the plaque as endorsing religion, the reasonable observer in this case
would view the plaque as a reminder of the history of Chester County.158
The court said that, based on the age of the plaque, the reasonable
observer views the Ten Commandments plaque as merely a longstanding
historic plaque, and does not really view it as an endorsement of
another problem with the endorsement test. By ignoring governmental purpose, the
constitutionality of the act depends upon the perceptions of reasonable observers. Thus,
who the reasonable observers are becomes very important. See supra Part I.B.2
(discussing the problems with using either “real” people or “hypothetical objective
observers” under this prong of the endorsement test).
154. Id. at 259. If this is truly the case, the court should have analyzed the effect of
the display according to both what the intention of displaying the plaque was originally
in 1920, as well as the intent behind the County’s refusal to remove the plaque in 2001.
The court acknowledged that this analysis would be relevant to an inquiry regarding the
County’s purpose under the Lemon test, but did not think it applied to considering the
effect of the display. Id. at 261–62.
155. Id. at 262.
156. Id. at 264; see also King v. Richmond County, 331 F.3d 1271, 1274, 1284
(11th Cir. 2003) (holding that a county seal containing the words “Superior Court
Richmond County, GA” as well as a sword and two tablets designed to resemble the text
of the Ten Commandments did not violate the Establishment Clause because the
presence of the sword made it reasonable that observers would understand the depiction
of the Ten Commandments as a symbol of the secular legal system), reh’g en banc
denied, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 21307 (Aug. 6, 2003).
157. Freethought, 334 F.3d at 264. There were other plaques and monuments near
the Ten Commandments plaque, including a no-smoking sign, plaques concerning
Courthouse hours and building access, and a no-skateboarding sign, but the court did not
believe that these signs changed the effect of the Ten Commandments plaque on the
reasonable observer. Id. at 254, 264. Age and history, however, changed the effect of
the plaque because a reasonable observer is presumed to be aware of the history of the
plaque. Id. at 264. As such, the reasonable observer in this case would know that the
plaque had been displayed on the courthouse for eighty years. Id. at 264–65.
158. Id. at 265.
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religion.159 This contradicts the court’s acknowledgment that “history
by itself may not be sufficient to change an otherwise religious display
into something that is not perceived by the reasonable observer as an
endorsement of religion.”160 The court recognized that historical
acceptance of a practice does not make the practice constitutional, but
then failed to take into account the entire historical context surrounding
the erection of the plaque.161
If the reasonable observer is presumed to know the history of the
display, the observer presumably knows the entire history, including the
circumstances surrounding the initial display of the plaque.162 Recognizing
the observer’s knowledge of why the plaque was displayed in the first
place could make an enormous difference in Freethought. Had the court
framed the reasonable observer as knowing that the plaque was donated
by a religious organization and erected following a religious dedication
ceremony, the court could have likely concluded that a reasonable
observer would view the initial erection of the plaque as a religious act
and also view the County’s refusal to remove the plaque as religiously
motivated.163 The court, however, did not engage in such analysis and
reached the conclusion that display of the Ten Commandments plaque
did not violate the Establishment Clause.164
The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, however, decided in
Glassroth v. Moore165 that a display of the Ten Commandments in a
159. Id. The court noted that a reasonable person would perceive a decision to
leave a Ten Commandments plaque that was erected many years ago in place as a desire
to preserve a longstanding plaque. Id. In contrast, a reasonable person would perceive a
current decision to erect a Ten Commandments plaque as more likely motivated by
religious considerations. Id.
160. Id. at 266.
161. In its conclusion that historical context suggests that the County was
attempting to preserve a longstanding plaque rather than endorse religion, the court noted
that the County had not taken any action involving the plaque since it was first erected
(there had not been ceremonies celebrating any anniversaries of the plaque, the plaque
was not relocated when the old entrance was closed, etc.), but never referred to the fact
that the plaque was donated by the Religious Education Council and was affixed to the
Courthouse after a dedication ceremony presided over by a Protestant Minister. Id. at
251, 266.
162. It is a somewhat unfair analysis, therefore, for the court to rely on the
reasonable observer’s knowledge of the County’s conduct following the erection of the
plaque, but to then ignore the observer’s knowledge of why the plaque was initially
displayed on the Courthouse.
163. This is just one possibility, however. The court could still rely more heavily
on the fact that the County has done nothing to draw attention to the plaque since its
erection, arriving at the conclusion that the County is primarily motivated by its desire to
preserve a historical plaque. Even if the court were to still conclude the case this way,
fairness dictates that the court consider the circumstances surrounding the initial
placement of the plaque and the possible affect it could have on reasonable observers.
164. Freethought, 334 F.3d at 270.
165. 335 F.3d 1282 (11th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1000 (2003).
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courthouse rotunda was a violation of the Establishment Clause.166 The
court, applying the Lemon test, found that the display of the Ten
Commandments monument violated the Establishment Clause because
the evidence showed that the primary purpose of the monument was to
endorse or promote religion.167
The court, however, did not stop its analysis at this point. In the
interest of completeness, the court also reviewed whether or not the
monument had the primary effect of advancing religion.168 After saying
that it would review whether or not the monument had the primary effect
of advancing religion, the court immediately stated, “[t]he effect prong
asks whether . . . the practice under review in fact would convey a
message of endorsement or disapproval to an informed, reasonable
observer.”169 The formulation of this inquiry into the effect of the
monument was important because the legislative intent behind erecting
the display was so clear.170
166. Id. at 1285, 1297. In Glassroth, the Chief Justice of the Alabama Supreme
Court erected a two-and-one-half ton monument of the Ten Commandments in the
rotunda of the Alabama State Judicial Building. Id. at 1284. The Chief Justice installed
the monument without first discussing the matter with any of the other eight justices of
the Alabama Supreme Court and did not use any government funds with respect to the
creation or installation of the monument. Id. at 1285. The monument weighed 5280
pounds, was approximately three feet wide by three feet deep by four feet tall, and was
located in such a position that people had to pass by the monument to gain access to the
elevator, stairs, restrooms, and law library. Id. These specific facts are included
because, again, “Establishment Clause challenges are not decided by bright-line rules,
but on a case-by-case basis with the result turning on the specific facts.” Id. at 1288
(citing King v. Richmond County, 331 F.3d 1271, 1275–76 (11th Cir. 2003)).
167. Id. at 1297. This is a unique case because the motive for displaying the
monument was unequivocal and easy to ascertain. The Chief Justice stated that he
installed the monument “to remind all Alabama citizens of . . . his belief in the
sovereignty of the Judeo-Christian God over both the state and the church.” Id. at 1284.
Furthermore, in a speech commemorating the installation of the monument, the Chief
Justice explained that “this monument will serve to remind the appellate courts and
judges . . . that in order to establish justice, we must invoke ‘the favor and guidance of
Almighty God.’” Id. at 1286.
168. Id. at 1297.
169. Id. (quoting King, 331 F.3d at 1279). This is actually the second prong of the
endorsement test, not the Lemon test. See supra note 131 and accompanying text
(discussing how the notion of endorsement has been largely absorbed into the second
prong of the Lemon test).
170. Id. at 1287. The Chief Justice was frank about why he installed the Ten
Commandments monument. During trial, he testified as follows:
Q
[W]as your purpose in putting the Ten Commandments monument in the
Supreme Court rotunda to acknowledge GOD’s law and GOD’s sovereignty?
A
Yes.
Q
. . . Do you agree that the monument, the Ten Commandments monument,
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Application of the endorsement test in Freethought and the Lemon test
in Glassroth, not the factual distinctions between the cases, led to the
different results. The explanation for this is that the legislative purpose
prong can be virtually ignored when applying the endorsement test, but
not when applying the Lemon test.171 The Third Circuit, utilizing the
endorsement test, did not examine the original purpose behind displaying
the plaque in Freethought, but the facts of the case suggest the existence
of religious motivations.172 Thus, had the Third Circuit applied the
Lemon test and seriously looked at Chester County’s purpose in erecting
the plaque in the first place, it is not so clear that the display would have
been deemed constitutional.173
The Eleventh Circuit did apply the Lemon test and therefore was
required to inquire into the purpose behind the erection of the monument.174
Accordingly, because the court found that Justice Moore’s installation of
the monument was clearly intended to advance religion, the display was
deemed unconstitutional.175 Had both Circuits employed the Lemon test,
they likely would have come to the same conclusion with respect to the
purpose prong and the cases would not be inconsistent.176
Some might argue, however, that the two cases would still reach
different results because they are factually different. For example, one
A
Q
A
Q
A

reflects the sovereignty of GOD over the affairs of men?
Yes.
And the monument is also intended to acknowledge GOD’s overruling
power over the affairs of men, would that be correct? . . .
Yes.
. . . [W]hen you say “GOD” you mean GOD of the Holy Scripture?
Yes.

Id.
171. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 690 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
Lemon’s purpose prong asks whether the government acted with the purpose of
endorsing or disapproving of religion. Id. “The effect prong asks whether, irrespective
of [the] government’s actual purpose, the practice under review in fact conveys a
message of endorsement or disapproval.” Id. (emphasis added). The challenged practice
will be deemed unconstitutional if there is an affirmative answer to either question. Id.
172. See supra note 161 and accompanying text.
173. That the plaque was donated by a religious group and was installed after a
dedication ceremony presided over by a minister are sufficient to raise a question as to
whether or not Chester County possessed a valid secular purpose in displaying the Ten
Commandments plaque.
174. “The Lemon test requires that the challenged practice have a valid secular
purpose . . . .” Glassroth, 335 F.3d at 1295.
175. Id. at 1296–97. Chief Justice Moore stated that his purpose in installing the
monument “was to acknowledge the law and sovereignty of the God of the Holy
Scriptures. . . .” Id. at 1296. Further, Justice Moore “refused a request to give a famous
speech equal position and prominence because, he said, placing ‘a speech of any man
alongside the revealed law of God would tend to diminish the very purpose of the Ten
Commandments monument.’” Id. (quoting Glassroth v. Moore, 229 F. Supp. 2d 1290,
1297 (M.D. Ala. 2002)).
176. See supra note 173.
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major factual distinction between Freethought and Glassroth is that, in
Freethought, the county merely accepted the plaque to be displayed, but,
in Glassroth, Justice Moore affirmatively acted to install the monument.177
One might argue, however, that the actions of an entire county are more
representative of government’s sentiment than are the acts of one
individual.178 This is not true, however, when the individual acts on behalf
of the government.179 Thus, this purported factual difference does not
really exist.
Factual distinctions, such as size, shape, and weight, do exist between
the Ten Commandments plaque in Freethought and the Ten Commandments
monument in Glassroth. These differences, however, should not form
the crux of Establishment Clause analysis.180 The factual circumstances
177. It is not necessarily the case, however, that mere acceptance of a religious
display would not be seen as an endorsement of religion.
178. This might be especially true in Glassroth because even though Justice Moore
acknowledged that he wanted the monument installed to advance religion, because he
acted alone and campaigned as the “Ten Commandments” judge, the citizens may not
have felt that the government was endorsing religion. Glassroth, 335 F.3d at 1284–85.
One could argue that although Justice Moore’s acts indicated that he endorsed religion,
his acting alone and failure to spend government funds in installing the monument could
insulate the government from appearing to endorse religion. See Dustin Zander,
Comment, Thou Shalt Not Post the Ten Commandments on the Courtroom Wall: Judge
Roy Moore and the Constitution, 9 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 371, 382 (1999) (stating that
Justice Moore can express his beliefs so long as he is not speaking for the government
when he does so).
179. While people may agree that Justice Moore should be able to express his
religious beliefs, they might also argue that he should not be able to express these beliefs
when speaking or acting on behalf of the government. This notion finds support in case
law. See N.C. Civil Liberties Union Legal Found. v. Constangy, 947 F.2d 1145, 1151
(4th Cir. 1991) (stating that a judge opening his courtroom with a prayer is a violation of
the Establishment Clause). This is because:
When a judge sits on the bench, says “Let us pause for a moment of prayer,”
and proceeds to recite a prayer in court, clearly the court is conveying a
message of endorsement of religion. “Such an endorsement is not consistent
with the established principle that the government must pursue a course of
complete neutrality toward religion.” [Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 60
(1985).] Judge Constangy argues that the prayer he delivers is his personal
prayer and thus it does not result in government endorsement of religion. We
find Judge Constangy’s argument wholly unpersuasive. A judge wearing a
robe and speaking from the bench is obviously engaging in official conduct.
Id.
180. County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 675–76 (1989) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (stating that it is problematic to look at each
individual item in a holiday display because this would only be useful “after [the] Court
has decided a long series of holiday display cases, using little more than intuition and a
tape measure”). Justice Kennedy went on to say: “‘It would be appalling to conduct
litigation under the Establishment Clause as if it were a trademark case, with experts
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of each display should only be relevant insofar as they indicate an
infringement upon personal religious liberty as a result of government
action on behalf of religion in general or a specific religious group in
particular.
III. A MODIFIED COERCION TEST
Because the Lemon and endorsement tests have been insufficient in
resolving Establishment Clause cases in a consistent, reliable manner,
the Supreme Court should adopt a more workable test. There are several
alternatives to the Lemon and endorsement tests.181 Despite these
testifying about whether one display is really like another, and witnesses testifying
they were offended—but would have been less so were the crèche five feet closer to the
jumbo candy cane.’” Id. (quoting Am. Jewish Cong. v. Chicago, 827 F.2d 120, 130 (7th
Cir. 1987) (Easterbrook, J., dissenting)).
181. The following is not an exhaustive list, but rather suggests a few alternative
possibilities. First, we could have a test that deems an act, display, or statute
unconstitutional if it offends even one person. This is impractical in today’s pluralistic
society because it is likely that at least one person will find fault with or be offended by
almost any act, display, or statute that may be in existence. See Smith, supra note 39, at
291. Another potential problem with this test is that it would allow almost any practice
to be deemed a violation of the Establishment Clause. See, e.g., Neal R. Feigenson,
Political Standing and Governmental Endorsement of Religion: An Alternative to
Current Establishment Clause Doctrine, 40 DEPAUL L. REV. 53, 109 (1990) (suggesting
that a person might complain that the National Gallery of Art, a federally funded and
managed institution, promotes religion when it displays “works of art featuring Madonnas
and other sectarian subjects” because the presence of these images indicates that
“Christianity plays a more important part in the national heritage than do other religions
or sects”); see also, e.g., Douglas Laycock, Equal Access and Moments of Silence: The
Equal Status of Religious Speech by Private Speakers, 81 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 8 & nn.38–39
(1986) (arguing that “[a] little bit of government support for religion may only be a little
bit of establishment, but it is still an establishment”). Laycock contends:
The government should not . . . name a city or a naval vessel for the Body of
Christ [Corpus Christi, the name of a major city in Texas, is a Latin phrase
meaning “Body of Christ”] or the Queen of Angels [The original Spanish name
of Los Angeles was El Pueblo de Nuestra Señora la Reyna de los Angeles de
Porciuncula—“The Town of Our Lady the Queen of the Angels of
Porciuncula.” . . . The name of the city has since been shortened to El Pueblo
de la Reyna de los Angeles—“The Town of the Queen of Angels.”] Either
version names the city with an honorific title for Mary, a religious figure
significant only to Christians.
Id. If religious art and names of cities could be held to be violations of the Establishment
Clause, what practice would not be subject to being held unconstitutional under this test?
A second possibility for an alternative test would be that an act, display, or statute is
not a violation of the Establishment Clause unless it establishes a national religion.
Under this formulation, almost no practice would violate the Establishment Clause. This
is a problem because Americans’ First Amendment rights could be infringed without the
government going so far as to actually establish a national religion. For example, a city
might not officially declare an official religion, but the city might choose “to recognize,
through religious displays, every significant Christian holiday while ignoring the holidays of
all other faiths.” Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 664 n.3 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). The First Amendment rights of non-Christians would be violated in
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alternatives, the original intent of the Framers and the history of the
United States indicate that a modified coercion test is the most
appropriate for deciding Establishment Clause cases.182
this instance because it would be difficult for the city to maintain that it is not engaging
in the “unmistakable and continual preference for one faith” over another that the First
Amendment prohibits. Id. The First Amendment does not permit one religion to be
favored over other religions, for religion to be favored over non-religion, or for non-religion
to be favored over religion. See Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15–16 (1947)
(citing Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878)); see also Zorach v. Clauson,
343 U.S. 306, 314 (1952) (stating that the Constitution does not require that the
government show “callous indifference” to religion or religious groups).
Another option would be to strictly apply the Lemon and endorsement tests. See Loewy,
supra note 71, at 1069–70 (advocating serious application of the endorsement test to all
practices, including the Supreme Court’s invocation of “God save the United States and
this Honorable Court” in opening its sessions and the phrase “under God” in the Pledge
of Allegiance, as well as school prayer and holiday displays). This would result in
invalidation of the Court’s invocation and the current terminology of the Pledge. These
practical consequences of Loewy’s proposal closely resemble the practical consequences
of the first alternative test proposed (that most things the government does relating to
religion would violate the Establishment Clause). This is unacceptable because it stifles
appreciation for religious diversity and risks separating government and religion to such
a degree that the government might be seen as being hostile toward religion.
Government hostility toward religion, however, is not required by the First Amendment.
See Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 663–64 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (providing the example that “[i]f government is to participate in its citizens’
celebration of a holiday that contains both a secular and a religious component, enforced
recognition of only the secular aspect would signify the callous indifference toward
religious faith that our cases and traditions do not require”).
As opposed to devising a new test to replace the Lemon and endorsement tests, another
alternative might be to prevent the Supreme Court from deciding Establishment Clause
cases at all. The Constitution provides,
In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, and
those in which a State shall be a Party, the supreme Court shall have original
Jurisdiction. In all the other Cases before mentioned, the supreme Court shall
have appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and
under such Regulations as the Congress shall make.
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2. This provision seemingly supports the notion that
Congress can take away the Supreme Court’s power to review Establishment Clause
issues when those cases do not fall under the Court’s original jurisdiction. See generally
Ex Parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1869) (holding that Congress has the power
to make exceptions to the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction and, if Congress
removes an aspect of the Court’s appellate jurisdiction, the Court no longer has
jurisdiction over the case).
182. See Edwin Meese III, Interpreting the Constitution, in INTERPRETING THE
CONSTITUTION 13, 17 (Jack N. Rakove ed., 1990) (noting that original intent
jurisprudence is not difficult to describe). Meese states that the specific language of the
Constitution must be obeyed, and that where “there is a demonstrable consensus among
the framers and ratifiers as to a principle stated or implied by the Constitution, it
should be followed as well.” Id. Finally, Meese notes that “[w]here there is
ambiguity as to the precise meaning or reach of a constitutional provision, it should
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A. Original Intent
On June 8, 1789, James Madison proposed a series of amendments for
House approval.183 The amendment regarding establishment of religion
read: “The civil rights of none shall be abridged on account of religious
belief or worship, nor shall any national religion be established, nor shall
the full and equal rights of conscience be in any manner, or on any
pretext, infringed.”184 This proposed amendment was given to a select
committee of the House for consideration and was changed to: “[N]o
religion shall be established by law, nor shall the equal rights of
conscience be infringed.”185
Although the committee did not include any explanation for these
changes, a condensed version of the debates illuminates some of the
concerns surrounding the amendment.186 Commentary from some of the
individuals present at the debates suggests that a primary motivating
factor behind the amendment was the prevention of a national establishment
of religion.187 The proposed amendment that the committee adopted
be interpreted and applied in a manner so as to at least not contradict the text of the
Constitution itself.” Id. But see LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINAL INTENT AND THE
FRAMERS’ CONSTITUTION 322, 324 (1988) (“Acceptance of original intent as the
foundation of constitutional interpretation is unrealistic beyond belief. . . . A frozen
or scleroteric Constitution would lose its character as a document intended to serve
for ages to come.”). Inquiry into original intent as a guidepost for how to proceed
today, and slavish adherence to the thoughts and beliefs of individuals who lived
two hundred years ago are, however, two completely different concepts. This
Comment does not advocate laboring over the precise ideas and circumstances that
surrounded the Framers and then mindlessly applying what is discovered to current
Establishment Clause cases. Rather, this Comment supports examining the Framers’
original intent to act as one factor in shaping a framework that applies to society’s
current situation without sacrificing historical context. This position is reflective of
Meese’s comment that “[t]he Constitution is not a legislative code bound to the time in
which it was written. Neither, however, is it a mirror that simply reflects the thoughts
and ideas of those who stand before it.” Meese, supra, at 15. Ascertaining the original
intent of the First Amendment does not contradict Part I of this Comment, where the
legislative intent prong of the Lemon test is criticized. This is because discerning the
objective meaning or purpose of an amendment or a statute is a different task from
determining subjective legislative intent. See, e.g., Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578,
636 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[W]hile it is possible to discern the objective
‘purpose’ of a statute (i.e., the public good at which its provisions appear to be directed),
or even the formal motivation for a statute where that is explicitly set forth . . . discerning
the subjective motivation of those enacting the statute is, to be honest, almost always an
impossible task.”).
183. LEONARD W. LEVY, THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE: RELIGION AND THE FIRST
AMENDMENT 94 (2d ed., rev. 1994).
184. Id. at 95.
185. Id. at 96.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 96–99. For example:
Mr. Sylvester had some doubts of the propriety of the mode of expression
used in this paragraph. He apprehended that it was liable to a construction
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read: “Congress shall make no laws touching religion, or infringing the
rights of conscience,” but again, no reason was given for these changes.188
Still another change occurred when the entire House voted on the
proposed amendment clause by clause; “Fisher Ames of Massachusetts
moved that the amendment read: ‘Congress shall make no law establishing
religion, or to prevent the free exercise thereof, or to infringe the rights
of conscience.’”189
The House adopted Ames’s motion, but made a stylistic change to the

different from what had been made by the committee. He feared it might be
thought to have a tendency to abolish religion altogether.
....
Mr. Gerry said it would read better if it was, that no religious doctrine shall
be established by law.
Mr. Sherman thought the amendment altogether unnecessary, inasmuch as
Congress had no authority whatever delegated to them by the constitution to
make religious establishments . . . .
....
Mr. Madison said, he apprehended the meaning of the words to be, that
Congress should not establish a religion, and enforce the legal observation of it
by law, nor compel men to worship God in any manner contrary to their
conscience. Whether the words are necessary or not, he did not mean to say,
but they had been required by some of the State Conventions, who seemed to
entertain an opinion that under the clause of the constitution, which gave
power to Congress to make all laws necessary and proper to carry into
execution the constitution, and the laws made under it, enabled them to make
laws of such a nature as might infringe the rights of conscience, and establish a
national religion; to prevent these effects he presumed the amendment was
intended, and he thought it as well expressed as the nature of the language
would admit.
....
Mr. Madison thought, if the word national was inserted before religion, it
would satisfy the minds of honorable gentlemen. He believed that the people
feared one sect might obtain a preeminence, or two combine together, and
establish a religion to which they would compel others to conform. He thought
if the word national was introduced, it would point the amendment directly to
the object it was intended to prevent.
....
Mr. Gerry did not like the term national . . . . [The] antifederalists at that
time complained that they had injustice done them by the title, because they
were in favor of a Federal Government, and the others were in favor of a
national one . . . .
Mr. Madison withdrew his motion, but observed that the words “no national
religion shall be established by law,” did not imply that the Government was a
national one.
Id.
188.
189.

Id. at 101.
Id.
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phraseology before submitting it to the Senate.190 The proposed amendment
then read: “Congress shall make no law establishing religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof, nor shall the rights of conscience be
infringed.”191
The Senate further changed the wording so that the amendment read:
“Congress shall make no law establishing articles of faith or a mode of
worship, or prohibiting the free exercise of religion.”192 The House rejected
this proposal because it was not satisfied with a simple ban prohibiting
the preference of one sect or religion over others.193 On September 24,
1789, the House reported to the Senate that it would accept the Senate’s
version of other amendments provided that the amendment on religion
read: “Congress shall make no laws respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.”194 The Senate accepted
this condition on September 25, 1789, and Congress thus passed the
Establishment Clause.195
One piece of information that can be gleaned from the progression of
the wording of the Establishment Clause is that the House did not intend
to draft an amendment that only prohibited Congress from supporting
one sect, church, denomination, or religion.196 Nevertheless, some
people advocate the position that the federal government may not favor
one sect, church, denomination, or religion over another, but that the
government may aid and support religion in general or all denominations
without discrimination.197
190. Id. at 101–02.
191. Id. at 102.
192. Id. This language resulted after three motions of special interest were proposed
and denied. The first proposal would have had the text of the amendment read: “Congress
shall make no law establishing one religious sect or society in preference to others.” Id.
The second motion would have the amendment read: “Congress shall not make any law
infringing the rights of conscience, or establishing any religious sect or society.” Id. The
final motion would have changed the language of the amendment to: “Congress shall
make no law establishing any particular denomination of religion in preference to
another.” Id.
193. Id. at 103–04.
194. Id. at 104.
195. Id.
196. Id. In other words, the House was not only concerned with preventing a
nationwide preference for one religious denomination over others.
197. Id. at 105. However, Levy argues that such a reading is impermissible because
this position leads to
the impossible conclusion that the First Amendment added to Congress’s
power. Nothing supports such a conclusion. Every bit of evidence goes to
prove that the First Amendment, like the others, was intended to restrict
Congress to its enumerated powers. Because Congress possessed no power
under the Constitution to legislate on matters concerning religion, Congress
has no such power even in the absence of the First Amendment.
Id.
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The Supreme Court, however, has not accepted this argument.198 The
Court has viewed the Establishment Clause as erecting a “wall of
separation” between church and state, as well as protecting individuals’
freedom of conscience in religious worship.199 Therefore, it can be said
that the Establishment Clause guarantees more protection than simply
preventing the government from establishing a national religion or
preferring one religious group over another.200 But, how far does the
198. See generally Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
199. See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878). When the
Constitution was being drafted, Thomas Jefferson was not in attendance. Id. at 163.
Yet, when he saw a draft of the document, he was disappointed that it did not contain a
provision ensuring the freedom of religion. Id. Several states proposed amendments
regarding religious freedom and would not ratify the Constitution until these
amendments were considered. Id. at 164. Accordingly, James Madison proposed a
religious freedom amendment that was adopted because it addressed the concerns of the
advocates of religious freedom. Id. Thomas Jefferson spoke to the Danbury Baptist
Association regarding the amendment and stated:
Believing with you that religion is a matter which lies solely between man and
his God; that he owes account to none other for his faith or his worship; that
the legislative powers of the government reach actions only, and not
opinions,—I contemplate with sovereign reverence that act of the whole
American people which declared that their legislature should “make no law
respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof,” thus building a wall of separation between church and State.
Adhering to this expression of the supreme will of the nation in behalf of the
rights of conscience, I shall see with sincere satisfaction the progress of those
sentiments which tend to restore man to all his natural rights, convinced he has
no natural right in opposition to his social duties.
Id. The Court went on to say that this statement could be accepted “almost as an
authoritative declaration of the scope and effect of the amendment” because it was made
by an acknowledged leader of the advocates of the amendment. Id. Further, the Court,
in Davis v. Beason stated that “religion” refers to one’s perception of his relationship to
his Creator. 133 U.S. 333, 342 (1890). The Court also stated that although “religion” is
often confused with “the cultus or form of worship of a particular sect,” it is in fact
distinguishable from a particular form of worship. Id. The use of “religion” in the First
Amendment, according to the Court, was intended to allow each person to define his or
her relationship with his or her Maker and to demonstrate this worship as he or she
deemed appropriate. Id. Finally, the First Amendment’s use of “religion” was intended
to “prohibit legislation for the support of any religious tenets, or the modes of worship of
any sect.” Id.
200. See LEVY, supra note 182, at 174. “An uncontested and incontestable fact that
stands out from the establishment clause is that the United States cannot constitutionally
enact any law preferring one church over others in any way whatever.” Id.; see also
Philip B. Kurland, The Origins of the Religion Clauses of the Constitution, 27 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 839, 860 (1986) (“The intended direction of the first amendment was the
enhancement of individual freedom. . . . [T]he objectives were to establish an equality
among persons, so that each individual could choose without interference how to
commune with his god, and to avoid the havoc that religious conflicts had imposed on
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protection of the Establishment Clause extend, considering that the
legislative history of the First Amendment does not indicate what the
Framers meant by “an establishment of religion?”201 Because there is no
clear answer to this question, it is best to view the protections of the
Establishment Clause in terms of what it was meant to accomplish,
rather than attempting to draw bright lines regarding its scope.
B. Historical Tradition
Because the Framers’ original intent only indicates that, at a
minimum, the federal government may not establish a national religion
or favor one religious group over another, examining the history of the
United States is also useful in determining what the Establishment
Clause was designed to achieve. Many of the early settlers of America
left Europe to escape laws that compelled them to support and attend
government-favored churches.202 Nevertheless, these practices continued in
America because the English Crown granted charters authorizing
individuals and companies to build religious establishments.203 The
charters further provided that all people, whether religious believers or
not, would be required to support and attend the established churches.204
This resulted in the persecution of those who were in the religious
minority and the requirement that religious minorities pay tithes and taxes
to support government-sponsored churches.205 In response, the Virginia
Assembly enacted the Virginia Bill for Religious Liberty, which promoted
mankind throughout history.”).
201. LEVY, supra note 183, at 105; see Michael W. McConnell, Coercion: The Lost
Element of Establishment, 27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 933, 936–37 (1986) (arguing that in
examining Madison’s comments to the First Congress regarding his proposals for the
religion amendment, “compulsion is not just an element, it is the essence of an
establishment”). With respect to what the Framers meant by “an establishment of religion,”
see Douglas G. Smith, The Establishment Clause: Corollary of Eighteenth-Century
Corporate Law?, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 239, 240 (2003) (suggesting that the Framers
“understood the term ‘establishment’ in a very technical sense”). Smith asserts,
“‘Establishing’ a religion was essentially equivalent to granting a special corporate
charter to a particular religious denomination. . . . Accordingly, in prohibiting Congress
from issuing any laws respecting an ‘establishment’ of religion, the founders sought to
prohibit the federal government from passing laws relating to such corporate charters.”
Id. at 240. States, not the federal government, could grant these corporate charters, so
the Establishment Clause functioned to define the roles of federal and state governments
with respect to religious establishments. Id. As such, the clause made clear that the
federal government could not grant corporate charters, and therefore could not establish
a national religion. “Thus, the clause embodied the more general belief of the time that
the federal government lacked authority in matters pertaining to corporations, whether
secular or ecclesiastical.” Id. at 241.
202. Everson, 330 U.S. at 8.
203. Id. at 9.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 10.
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religious tolerance.206
Despite the problems associated with the union of government and
religion, our government has historically recognized the role that religion
plays in the lives of its citizens in a number of ways.207 Even the Supreme
Court itself has recognized that “[w]e are a religious people whose
institutions presuppose a Supreme Being.”208 Accordingly, the government
respects differences in religious belief and allows all of its citizens to
express the different beliefs and creeds that they hold.209 This governmental
recognition of religion seems inconsistent with modern establishment
clause theories that advocate complete separation of government and
religion. However, governmental recognition of religion is consistent
with Establishment Clause jurisprudence if one acknowledges that the
Establishment Clause was directed at prohibiting religious coercion.210
206. Id. at 12. The bill stated, “no man shall be compelled to frequent or support
any religious worship, place, or ministry whatsoever, nor shall be enforced, restrained,
molested, or burthened [sic] in his body or goods, nor shall otherwise suffer on account
of his religious opinions or belief.” Id. at 13.
207. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 675–77 (1984). The Court noted:
Our history is replete with official references to the value and invocation of
Divine guidance in deliberations and pronouncements of the Founding Fathers
and contemporary leaders. Beginning in the early colonial period long before
Independence, a day of Thanksgiving was celebrated as a religious holiday to
give thanks for the bounties of Nature as gifts from God.
....
Other examples of reference to our religious heritage are found in the
statutorily prescribed national motto “In God We trust,” which Congress and
the President mandated for our currency . . . .
Art galleries supported by public revenues display religious paintings of the
15th and 16th centuries, predominantly inspired by one religious faith.
. . . [Finally,] Congress has directed the President to proclaim a National
Day of Prayer each year.
Id.
208. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313 (1952).
209. See Kurland, supra note 200, at 860 (“If there is any fixed star in our
constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall
be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to
confess by word or act their faith therein.”) (quoting W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette,
319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943)).
210. McConnell, supra note 201, at 939. McConnell notes:
In the debates in the First Congress concerning the wording of the first
amendment, James Madison, the principal draftsman and proponent, said of
the committee draft that he “apprehended the meaning of the words to be, that
Congress should not establish a religion, and enforce the legal observation of it
by law, nor compel men to worship God in any manner contrary to their
conscience.” Upon further questioning by those who feared that the proposed
amendment “might be taken in such latitude as to be extremely hurtful to the
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C. Formulation of the Modified Coercion Test
The original formulation of the coercion test is not the proper test for
Establishment Clause issues because it is difficult to apply. The Court’s
coercion analysis in Lee v. Weisman211 has been interpreted as finding a
practice unconstitutional when “(1) the government directs (2) a formal
religious exercise (3) in such a way as to oblige the participation of
objectors.”212 Under this formulation, it is not easy to define what
constitutes a “formal religious exercise.”213 Further, to find that the
Establishment Clause has been violated, these criteria are sufficient, but
not necessary.214
A modified coercion test is therefore a better alternative to applying
the original formulation of the coercion test for two reasons. First, it
takes into account Framers’ intent that not only should the government
be prohibited from establishing a national religion, but also that freedom
of conscience regarding religion should be closely guarded.215 Second, it
also recognizes that historical practice in the United States demonstrates
that religion is an important part of society.216 In this regard, the proper
test should hold that violation of the First Amendment occurs when the
government consistently exposes observers to an obtrusive religious
cause of religion,” Madison clarified the point. He stated that he “believed that
the people feared one sect might obtain a pre-eminence, or two combine
together, and establish a religion to which they would compel others to
conform.” Is compulsion an element of an establishment clause violation? If
Madison’s explanations to the First Congress are any guide, compulsion is not
just an element, it is the essence of an establishment.
Id. at 936–37 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
211. 505 U.S. 577 (1992).
212. Jones v. Clear Creek Indep. Sch. Dist., 977 F.2d 963, 970 (5th Cir. 1992).
213. “Formal religious exercise” connotes an event, such as the invocation of prayer
or the performance of a religious service. Yet, the government could risk establishing a
national religion or infringing upon individuals’ freedom of conscience regarding
religion without directing such a “formal religious exercise.”
214. That is, while the Establishment Clause is violated when these elements exist,
violations can still occur in the absence of these requirements.
215. Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 12–13 (1947). The Preamble to the
Virginia Bill for Religious Liberty stated:
Almighty God hath created the mind free; that all attempts to influence it by
temporal punishments or burthens [sic], or by civil incapacitations, tend only
to beget habits of hypocrisy and meanness, and are a departure from the plan
of the Holy author of our religion, who being Lord both of body and mind, yet
chose not to propagate it by coercions on either . . . ; that to compel a man to
furnish contributions of money for the propagation of opinions which he
disbelieves, is sinful and tyrannical; that even the forcing him to support this or
that teacher of his own religious persuasion, is depriving him of the
comfortable liberty of giving his contributions to the particular pastor, whose
morals he would make his pattern.
Id. (emphasis added).
216. See supra note 207.
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symbol. There are three elements that can be distilled from this test:
there must be government action, an obtrusive religious symbol, and
consistent exposure to the religious symbol.217
For a violation to occur, the government must be acting. This is because
the First Amendment prohibits Congress, not private citizens, from
making laws respecting an establishment of religion.218 Government
action exists when a government entity or representative is the catalyst
that brings a particular statute, regulation, or display into existence.219
There must also be an obtrusive religious symbol to which observers
are consistently exposed for the Establishment Clause to be violated.220
This is because the presence of a prominent religious symbol displayed
continually throughout the year indicates that the government is proselytizing
on behalf of religion generally or one religion in particular.221
217. For purposes of this proposed test, “symbol” is applied expansively, including
both physical objects and words, for increased application of this test to various
Establishment Clause cases. Nevertheless, despite the desire to be able to apply the test
to as many Establishment Clause scenarios as possible, certain cases will likely arise
wherein application of this test might be ill-suited.
218. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
219. Thus, private action will not be sufficient to violate the Establishment Clause.
See, e.g., Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 770 (1995)
(holding that the Capitol Square Review Board’s act of permitting the Ku Klux Klan to
erect a cross on the statehouse plaza during the Christmas season did not violate the
Establishment Clause because “[r]eligious expression cannot violate the Establishment
Clause where it (1) is purely private and (2) occurs in a traditional or designated public
forum, publicly announced and open to all on equal terms”).
220. “Obtrusive” is meant to get at the notion of the prominence of the religious
symbol in any display or practice and is therefore defined as follows: “Characterized by
forcibly thrusting (oneself, one’s opinions, etc.) into notice or prominence.” 10 OXFORD
ENGLISH DICTIONARY 671 (J.A. Simpson & E.S.C. Weiner eds., 2d ed. 1989).
Accordingly, size and placement of the symbol will be relevant factors, but not the
primary focus, so as to avoid the problem of the Court deciding cases with “little more
than intuition and a tape measure.” County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 675
(1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
221. Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 661 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). Justice Kennedy noted that symbolic recognition of religious faith could violate
the Establishment Clause. As an example, Justice Kennedy stated that the Establishment
Clause would prohibit a city from permanently erecting a large Latin cross on the roof of
city hall. Id. Justice Kennedy said that this is the case “not because government speech
about religion is per se suspect, as the majority would have it, but because such an
obtrusive year-round religious display would place the government’s weight behind an
obvious effort to proselytize on behalf of a particular religion.” Id.; see also Friedman v.
Bd. of County Comm’rs, 781 F.2d 777, 781 (10th Cir. 1985) (stating that a county seal
containing a Latin cross and the phrase “With This We Conquer” might not always
violate the Establishment Clause). The court noted that some uses of the seal might not
indicate an impermissible union of church and state. Id. For example, the court said that
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“Proselytizing” suggests that the government is improperly running the
risk of establishing a national religion or curbing individual freedom in
religious matters.222
This modified coercion test is, therefore, consistent with the principles
underlying the First Amendment: that the government may not establish
a national religion, and that individuals’ freedom of conscience must be
respected.223 This test is also proper because it acknowledges that
passive acknowledgment of religion, without coercion, does not pose a
great risk of establishing religion or infringing upon religious liberty.224
Finally, the test is useful because it focuses on the actor, the action
taking place, and the result of this action.
The use of a coercion test to resolve Establishment Clause cases has,
however, been criticized. One criticism is that coercion tests require “a
de minimis threshold of impermissible religious content. If there is not a
sufficiently religious component to the message, then the . . . test does
not apply; the difficulty is in defining de minimis . . . .”225 The proposed
using the seal as a notary seal or only depicting the seal in one color (where it is difficult
to detect the cross) might not violate the Establishment Clause. Id. The seal at issue in
Friedman, however, was distinguished from the crèche in Lynch and deemed
unconstitutional because it
pervade[d] the daily lives of county residents. It [wa]s not displayed once a
year for a brief period on a single parcel of government land. Rather it
appear[ed] on all county paper work, on all county vehicles, even on county
sheriff’s uniforms. Further, Bernalillo County residents d[id] not view the
cross and motto in the context of a generally secular commercial display, as
Pawtucket, Rhode Island, residents d[id] the crèche. The context of the cross
and motto [wa]s quite different. The cross [wa]s the only visual element on
the seal that [wa]s surrounded by rays of light. The motto may be fairly
regarded as promoting the religion the cross represents. Indeed, that religion
seems to be embraced as the instrument by which the county “conquers.”
Id. at 782.
222. See 12 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 664 (J.A. Simpson & E.S.C. Weiner
eds., 2d ed. 1989) (defining “proselyte” as follows: “[T]o cause to come over or turn
from one opinion, belief, creed, or party to another; esp. to convert from one religious
faith or sect to another”). Government proselytization undermines the principles
embodied by the First Amendment insofar as government action that attempts to cause
individuals to modify their religious beliefs does not respect freedom of conscience
regarding religion.
223. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943). Justice
Jackson stated, “[i]f there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no
official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism,
religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith
therein.” Id.; see also County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 660 (1989)
(Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (noting that “[t]he freedom to
worship as one pleases without government interference or oppression is the great object
of . . . the Establishment [Clause]”).
224. Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 662 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
225. Matthew A. Peterson, Note, The Supreme Court’s Coercion Test: Insufficient
Constitutional Protection for America’s Religious Minorities, 11 CORNELL J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 245, 255 (2001).
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modified coercion test avoids this problem by defining what constitutes
improper government action more clearly than did previous formulations
of the coercion test.226 Another criticism is that coercion standards allow
the government to engage in religious approval or disapproval, so long
as dissenters are free to ignore the approval or disapproval.227 The
modified coercion test, however, does not require that an act, statute, or
display be deemed constitutional so long as objectors are free to ignore
the religious content.228 In this regard, the modified coercion test seeks
to be sensitive to religious minorities and to strike a balance between
promoting religious diversity and restricting government action to the
confines of the First Amendment.
IV. APPLICATION OF THE MODIFIED COERCION TEST
The benefits of the modified coercion test can best be seen in applying
it to the facts of actual cases. The holiday display, Ten Commandments,
and Pledge of Allegiance cases previously analyzed under the Lemon
and endorsement tests also provide good opportunities for examining the
implications of the modified coercion test.
Applying the modified coercion test to the facts of Lynch would result
in the display of the crèche being deemed constitutional because observers
were not consistently exposed to an obtrusive religious symbol. Although
the government was arguably acting in Lynch, as it undertook the task of
displaying the crèche on its own and paying for the set-up and takedown costs each year,229 whether or not display of the crèche constitutes
an obtrusive religious symbol is unclear from the facts of Lynch.230
Nevertheless, to properly consider the concerns of religious minorities,
we can assume that the crèche was in fact an obtrusive religious symbol.
Despite these facts, the crèche was only displayed in the limited context
226. See supra note 213 discussing the difficulties with defining the “formal
religious exercise” requirement of the coercion test formulated in Lee.
227. Peterson, supra note 225, at 256.
228. See infra pp. 400–01 for further discussion as to how the display of a Ten
Commandments monument violates the Establishment Clause despite the fact that
observers are free to ignore the display.
229. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 671 (1984).
230. See supra note 94. The facts of the case state that figures of Jesus, Mary, and
Joseph were included in the display together with secular symbols of Christmas such as
Santa Claus, reindeer, and candy canes. These facts do not indicate the prominence of
the religious symbols in relation to the secular ones. Therefore, it is difficult to say with
certainty whether or not the crèche was an obtrusive religious symbol.
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of the holiday season. Therefore, display of the crèche does not satisfy
all elements of the modified coercion test and should be deemed a
constitutional display.
It is undoubted that one principal objection to this analysis is that
when the government acts to display an obtrusive religious symbol, the
display should be deemed unconstitutional whether it is permanent or
not.231 Under an endorsement analysis, this objection might prove fatal
to the assertion that, to be unconstitutional, the government action
should be permanent instead of temporary. This is because, under an
endorsement approach, any appearance of governmental alliance with
religion is viewed as inappropriate. This is not the case under a coercion
analysis. The primary concerns of the modified coercion test, the prevention
of an establishment of a national religion and the protection of individual
religious liberty, are kept intact unless the government acts to repeatedly
proselytize on behalf of religion.
Display of the religious symbols in Allegheny would also be
constitutional under the modified coercion test. It is debatable as to
whether the government was acting in Allegheny because, unlike Lynch
where the city itself owned the display, in this case a Roman Catholic
group owned the crèche and a Jewish group owned the menorah.232 In
this regard, the government was not undertaking the task of exhibiting
the displays strictly of its own accord. To be deferential to religious
minorities, however, it will be assumed that the government acted by
displaying the religious symbols in Allegheny.233 It will also be assumed
that both displays contained obtrusive religious symbols because the
crèche display did not contain any secular symbols, and the Court’s
analysis of the secular nature of the menorah display contained logical
flaws.234 Even if one were to assume that the government was acting
231. See County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 608 n.56 (1989) (noting that
“[i]n describing what would violate his ‘proselytization’ test, Justice Kennedy uses the
adjectives ‘permanent,’ ‘year-round,’ and ‘continual,’ as if to suggest that temporary acts
of favoritism for a particular sect do not violate the Establishment Clause”) (citation
omitted).
232. See supra note 112.
233. See infra note 237 and accompanying text.
234. See supra notes 133–44 and accompanying text. The fact that the presence of
secular symbols was not as strong in Allegheny as it was in Lynch does not mean to
suggest that holiday displays must contain symbols of every religious holiday and
common secular symbols, such as Santa Clauses and candy canes, to be constitutional.
In fact, some scholars have named this very notion the “three plastic animals rule.” See, e.g.,
Michael W. McConnell, Religious Freedom at a Crossroads, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 115,
126–27 (1992). McConnell notes:
[A] plurality of the Court permitted the menorah in County of Allegheny v ACLU
because it was next to a forty-five-foot tall Christmas tree, and a majority
permitted the nativity scene in Lynch v Donnelly because it was surrounded by
a Santa Claus house, reindeer, candy-striped poles, a Christmas tree, carolers,
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and that the displays contained obtrusive religious symbols, the crèche
and menorah displays would be deemed constitutional under the
modified coercion test because they too were displayed in the limited
context of the holiday season.235
Applying the modified coercion test to the facts of Freethought, the
display of the Ten Commandments plaque would be found constitutional.
Whether or not there was government action in this case is questionable.
The county did not initiate the display of the Ten Commandments plaque
on its own, but rather displayed it after receiving it from a religious
group.236 It could be argued that accepting a religious display is as though
the government itself were acting because the government’s act of
accepting the display indicates its support and approval of the religious
ideals embodied within the display. To be considerate to religious
minorities, it will be assumed for purposes of this hypothetical that mere
governmental acceptance of a religious display will meet the necessary
governmental action required under the modified coercion test.237 Even if it
is assumed that the government affirmatively acted in displaying the plaque,
however, the plaque still does not violate the Establishment Clause.
cut-out figures representing such characters as a clown, an elephant, and a
teddy bear, hundreds of colored lights, a banner stating “Season’s Greetings,”
and a talking wishing well. In contrast, the Court held unconstitutional the
nativity scene in Allegheny, which was tastefully displayed with a backdrop of
greenery and poinsettias, but unaccompanied by secular signs of the season.
Practitioners have dubbed the holdings in Lynch and Allegheny “the threeplastic animals rule.”
Id. (footnotes omitted).
235. See supra note 231 and accompanying text.
236. See supra note 150.
237. The assumption that governmental acceptance of a display is the equivalent of
governmental action to create a display is used for this hypothetical but is not necessarily
true for real-life applications. That is, it is not clear that mere governmental acceptance
should be treated the same way that governmental action is treated. Although the county
accepted the plaque from a religious organization and placed it at the entrance to the
courthouse, this is not the type of action directed by the government in Lynch, where the
city owned the religious object and erected and dismantled the display each year.
Freethought Soc’y v. Chester County, 334 F.3d 247, 249–50 (3d Cir. 2003). The county
accepted the plaque and placed it at the entrance to the courthouse, but left the plaque in
that location without drawing attention to, maintaining, or celebrating it. Yet, some
might argue that the county’s act of accepting the plaque for display at all constitutes
sufficient government action to meet the first prong of the proposed coercion test. More
facts of the case must be known before this argument can be proven true. If the county
refused to accept plaques from other organizations, religious or nonreligious, or accepted
all plaques but only displayed the plaque of the Ten Commandments, this argument may
be well-founded. However, the act of accepting, in and of itself cannot necessarily be
deemed the acceptor’s endorsement of the object accepted.
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The plaque in Freethought does not violate the Establishment Clause
because it is not an obtrusive religious symbol. Although the plaque is
certainly a religious symbol as it contains the text of the Ten Commandments,
it is not obtrusive because it is one plaque displayed among many.238
This is not to say that a religious monument must be surrounded by
secular signs and plaques to be constitutional or that all religious monuments
that are surrounded by secular plaques are constitutional.239 Under the
facts of this case, however, the Ten Commandments plaque was not
prominent or obtrusive in light of the facts that there were secular/ministerial
plaques surrounding it and that the county never did anything to draw
attention to or celebrate the plaque.240 Because the plaque is not an
obtrusive symbol, the requirements of the modified coercion test are not
met and the plaque does not violate the Establishment Clause.241
Applying the modified coercion test to the facts of Glassroth would
result in the display of the Ten Commandments monument being held
unconstitutional. It can be said that the government acted to install the
monument, as Chief Justice Moore was acting in his official capacity as
a government official when he erected the monument.242 Secondly, the
monument was obtrusive as it was prominently placed in the center of

238. The Ten Commandments plaque was fifty inches tall and thirty-nine inches
wide, surrounded by other plaques, such as a no-smoking sign that was twenty-four
inches tall and seventeen inches wide, three plaques regarding courthouse hours that
were fifty-three inches tall and twenty-six inches wide altogether, a small plaque stating
that the courthouse had been placed on the National Register of Historic Places, and a
no-skateboarding sign that was twenty-four inches tall and seventeen inches wide. Id. at
253–54.
239. The circumstances surrounding any given plaque are relevant in determining
the plaque’s overall prominence in the display. Thus, it is not the absolute size of the
religious plaque that is relevant (i.e., it is not the case that all plaques smaller than five-feet
by five-feet are constitutional, whereas all displays larger than these dimensions are
unconstitutional), but rather the factual surroundings of the display as a whole. See
supra notes 220–21 and accompanying text.
240. In fact, when the entrance to the courthouse was moved in 2001, the Ten
Commandments plaque was not relocated to the new entrance. Freethought, 334 F.3d at
253.
241. This is the case even if display of the plaque is consistent, since all elements
must be met for an Establishment Clause violation to occur. Nevertheless, whether or
not display of the plaque is consistent is questionable. The plaque was consistently
displayed for eighty years above the entrance, but the plaque was not relocated to the
new entrance in 2001. Id. at 253–54. Observers are not consistently exposed to this
religious plaque currently, as they would have to go out of their way to proceed to the
old entrance to view the plaque. Id.
242. Glassroth v. Moore, 335 F.3d 1282, 1285 (11th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 540
U.S. 1000 (2003). Justice Moore, as Chief Justice, has final authority over the
decoration of the rotunda and whether to put any displays in the building. Id. Further,
after Justice Moore was elected Chief Justice, he fulfilled his campaign promise to
“restore the moral foundation of law” by installing the Ten Commandments monument.
Id.
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the courthouse rotunda.243 Another indication of the monument’s
prominence is the fact that Justice Moore rejected a request to display a
historically significant speech in the same area.244 Unlike the plaque in
Freethought that was displayed among many other plaques, the
monument here was displayed by itself in the center of the courthouse
rotunda, while requests for other texts to be displayed were rejected.245
The monument in Glassroth was the product of government action, was
obtrusive, and observers were consistently exposed to it. Observers were
subjected to consistent exposure to the display because the monument
was a permanent display within the courthouse, as opposed to being
displayed during a limited season like the displays in both Lynch and
Allegheny. These facts indicate that the government was acting to elevate
religion’s status above secular status. Therefore, application of the modified
coercion test would find the display to violate the Establishment Clause.
Finally, application of the proposed modified coercion test to Newdow
v. United States Congress, the Pledge of Allegiance case, would result in
deeming the phrase “under God” unconstitutional. First, the Pledge
itself is the product of government action as the government created the
Pledge and added the phrase “under God” to it in 1954.246 More
243. Id. at 1284. The monument was displayed in the center of the rotunda so that
“[n]o one who enter[ed] the building through the main entrance [could] miss the
monument.” Id. at 1285.
244. Id. at 1284.
245. The plaques in Freethought were all similar in size, and both religious and
secular plaques were displayed alongside one another above an old entrance to the
courthouse. Freethought, 334 F.3d at 254. This is a stark contrast from one large
religious monument (here the monument weighed 5280 pounds and was three feet wide
by three feet deep by four feet tall) displayed by itself in the center of the courthouse
rotunda. Glassroth, 335 F.3d at 1285.
246. Loewy, supra note 71, at 1070; see also Brief Amici Curiae of Christian Legal
Society et al. at 5–6, Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 124 S. Ct. 1191 (2004)
(No. 02-1624) (discussing the addition of the phrase “under God” to the Pledge). The
Christian Legal Society noted that, by adding the phrase “under God” to the Pledge,
Congress wished to emphasize a distinction between the United States and Russia: that
the United States was a theistic nation but that Russia was not. The brief states that the
conference report makes this distinction clear.
At this moment of our history the principles underlying our American
Government and the American way of life are under attack by a system whose
philosophy is at direct odds with our own. Our American Government is
founded on the concept of the individuality and the dignity of the human being.
Underlying this concept is the belief that the human person is important
because he was created by God and endowed by Him with certain inalienable
rights which no civil authority may usurp. The inclusion of God in our pledge
therefore would further acknowledge the dependence of our people and our
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specifically, the facts of Newdow indicate that the government acted by
virtue of a school district policy that mandates that teachers lead willing
students in reciting the Pledge each morning.247 Because the school district
policy requires that the Pledge be recited each morning, students are
consistently exposed to it.248 Requiring students to attend school and
then requiring the recitation of the Pledge each morning puts objectors in
“the dilemma of participating, with all that implies, or protesting.”249
This is precisely the type of infringement upon freedom of conscience
with respect to religious liberty that the Establishment Clause was designed
to prohibit.
The only issue that remains, therefore, is whether or not the words
“under God” constitute an obtrusive religious symbol. Because “symbol”
under the proposed modified coercion test is defined expansively to
include both objects and words, the phrase “under God” itself can be
considered a religious symbol. This is because the phrase represents the
notion of a Christian God who created humans and a God upon whom
humans depend for rights and moral direction.250 This phrase, furthermore,
is an obtrusive religious symbol because it improperly ties citizens’
patriotism as Americans to an expressed belief in God.251 By including the
phrase “under God” in the Pledge, the government effectively communicates
Government upon the moral directions of the Creator. At the same time it
would serve to deny the atheistic and materialistic concepts of communism
with its attendant subservience of the individual.
Id.
247. Newdow v. United States Cong., 328 F.3d 466, 482–83 (9th Cir. 2002), cert.
granted in part, Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 540 U.S. 945 (2003), rev’d,
124 S. Ct. 2301 (2004), reh’g denied, 125 S. Ct. 21 (2004). Elk Grove Unified School
District requires that teachers lead their students in reciting the Pledge at the beginning
of each school day. Id. at 482. This policy stems from the fact that the California
Education Code mandates that public school days begin with “appropriate patriotic
exercises.” Id. The Education Code also states that recitation of the Pledge qualifies as
an appropriate patriotic exercise. Id. Accordingly, Elk Grove Unified School District
“has promulgated a policy that states, in pertinent part: ‘Each elementary school class
[shall] recite the pledge of allegiance to the flag once each day.’” Id. at 483.
248. One response to this assertion is that, in actuality, only those children who
wish to be exposed to the Pledge in fact encounter its content on a regular basis because
those students who object to reciting the Pledge are not required to participate. See W. Va.
State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 641–42 (1943) (holding that public school
students cannot be required to recite the Pledge). This is not a valid objection because
children can only avoid the content of and consistent exposure to the Pledge by
choosing, each and every day of the school year, to refrain from reciting it.
249. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 593 (1992).
250. See supra note 246.
251. See Brief of Amicus Curiae American Atheists at 21–23, Elk Grove Unified
Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 124 S. Ct. 1191 (2004) (No. 02-1624). The brief discusses why
addition of the phrase “under God” is an unnecessary part of an otherwise patriotic
exercise. Specifically, the brief refutes the notion that the phrase is needed to solemnify
public occasions and express hope in the future (as Justice O’Connor suggested that
these words function in her concurring opinion in Lynch v. Donnelly).
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to Americans that they must profess a belief in God to be patriotic
American citizens. This certainly crosses the line that the government,
under the First Amendment, is prohibited from curbing individuals’
freedom of conscience with respect to religious matters. Thus, including
the words “under God” in the Pledge violates the Establishment Clause
under the proposed modified coercion test.
The modified coercion test is by no means perfect and will likely be
met with much criticism. Yet, honest application of the test will provide
a framework that will furnish more consistent results, while taking into
account the purposes behind the Establishment Clause and religion’s
role in modern society.
V. CONCLUSION
The Lemon and endorsement tests each contain inherent flaws and
lead to inconsistent and incoherent results when applied to the facts of
actual cases. Furthermore, the holdings of Establishment Clause cases
in which the Court employed these tests communicate to adherents of
“majority” religions that their beliefs have little or no place in modern
society.252 This is unacceptable when the government is to respect
individuals’ religious liberty. The Lemon and endorsement tests should
therefore be abandoned.
The original intent of the Framers with respect to the First Amendment,
as well as the historical tradition of religion’s role in the United States,
demonstrates that a modified coercion test should emerge in place of the
Lemon and endorsement tests. This modified coercion test finds that a
violation of the First Amendment occurs when the government consistently
252. See County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 677 (1989) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Kennedy states:
Although Justice O’Connor disavows Justice Blackmun’s suggestion that the
minority or majority status of a religion is relevant to the question whether
government recognition constitutes a forbidden endorsement, the very nature
of the endorsement test, with its emphasis on the feelings of the objective
observer, easily lends itself to this type of inquiry. If there be such a person as
the “reasonable observer,” I am quite certain that he or she will take away a
salient message from our holding in these cases: the Supreme Court of the
United States has concluded that the First Amendment creates classes of
religions based on the relative numbers of their adherents. Those religions
enjoying the largest following must be consigned to the status of least favored
faiths so as to avoid any possible risk of offending members of minority
religions.
Id.
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exposes observers to an obtrusive religious symbol. This formulation
ensures that the government will not establish a national religion or
restrain individuals’ freedom of conscience in religious matters, without
underestimating the importance of religious diversity and tolerance for
differing beliefs.253
Accordingly, the modified coercion test provides a more consistent
Establishment Clause framework by invalidating only those actions in
which the government is engaged in that could lead to an establishment
of religion or which work to curtail individual freedom. A more
consistent framework is achieved because the modified coercion test
requires invalidating all actions where governmental activity undermines
the principles behind the First Amendment, including practices that the
Supreme Court has always upheld as constitutional.
This reinforces the notion that although church and state should
undoubtedly be kept separate, religion does not have to be completely
removed from society.254 There is a place for religion in modern society,
and the modified coercion test permits this.
LISA M. KAHLE

253. There are too many diverse groups in the United States for every person to
agree with every act that occurs, every display that is erected, etc. Allowing practices to be
deemed unconstitutional because some people disfavor them hinders tolerance for diversity
and runs the risk of eliminating religion from the public sphere altogether. See, e.g.,
Charles J. Russo, Prayer at Public School Graduation Ceremonies: An Exercise in
Futility or a Teachable Moment?, 1999 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 1, 20 (commenting on
tolerance generally, but specifically with respect to prayer in public schools, that the
government should encourage maintaining respect for various religious viewpoints).
Russo asserts that it will be somewhat hypocritical for educators to attempt to foster
appreciation for diversity generally if students are not permitted to be exposed to
divergent religious viewpoints. Id. Even more important, Russo contends that it is
dangerous to limit conversation on controversial issues if the United States is to grow as
a nation. Id.
254. Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 45–46 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (“The
Establishment Clause does not require that the public sector be insulated from all things
which may have a religious significance or origin.”); see also Michael J. Himes, Public
Theology in Service to a National Conversation (2003) (unpublished paper, on file with
author) (discussing a national conversation regarding religion’s place in the public
arena). Himes notes:
Whether one applauds or deplores the fact, being a religious believer will,
consciously or unconsciously, affect the way one votes, the kinds of public
policies one endorses, and the kinds of social and economic commitments one
makes. The issue is not whether one’s theology influences one’s involvement in
public life—it does, unless one is a thoroughly disintegrated human being—but
rather whether we acknowledge and deal with the fact.
Id. at 10; see also Laurie Messerly, Note, Reviving Religious Liberty in America, 8 NEXUS
151, 164 (2003) (arguing that removing religion from public life has not only harmed
America, but also would have been incomprehensible to the Framers because they
believed that government could not survive without religion as a moral influence).
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